Pakistan Journal of Social Research ISSN 2710-3129 (P) 2710-3137 (O) Vol. 4, No. 2, April-June 2022, pp. 146-154 www.pjsr.com.pk

UNDERSTANDING INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES FOR THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Ashfaq Ahmed

Assistant Professor, Department of Politics & International Relations (DPIR), University of Sargodha Pakistan (Corresponding Author <u>Danalyst@hotmail.com</u>)

Sadaf Ghayoor

Lecturer, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Lahore Sargodha Campus, Sargodha

Abdul Ghafar

M.Phil Scholar Department of Politics & International Relations University of Sargodha, Sargodha

ABSTRACT

This paper aims at investigating whether nuclear developments in South Asia challenge the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)? New Delhi and Islamabad have distinct nuclear weapons programmes both are tangled. South Asian nuclearization helps readership understand that states faced with existential threats mange to overcome technological challenges and acquire fissile material to develop nuclear weapons. South Asian nuclear proliferation enables arms control and disarmament activists to analyse, comprehend and draw lessons to strengthen disarmament efforts and prevent future nuclear proliferation. Primarily mutual suspicions, turbulent history and trust deficit resulted in mutual security dilemma. It resulted in qualitative and quantitative conventional arms race leading to nuclear proliferation. Security competition in South Asia and strategic environment in Pakistan's case affirms realist notion that self-help is the only recipe to survive in international system. Indian case ascertains that nuclear proliferation begets nuclear proliferation. Further, nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons. It essentially has grave impact on nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

Keywords: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, India, Pakistan, Technologically, Fissile Material.

INTRODUCTION

The history of nuclear proliferation and available writings concerning South Asian highlights motivated states maintains opacity to develop nuclear weapons. Second lesson drawn from this particular case is opaque nuclear proliferation is continued in the guise of peaceful nuclear program. Opacity and rhetoric against dark side of the nuclear weapons helps states to acquire dual use technology, fissile material, and necessary knowhow to develop nuclear weapons. South Asian states nuclear weapons programmes is considered to be tangled regionally and with major powers. Presumably, it has implications for international strategic stability. This paper endeavors to test hypothesis that continued qualitative and quantitative nuclear proliferation and rejection of global arms control and disarmament efforts challenges the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) from outside of the accord. The notion of security dilemma- efforts to consolidate one's own security stimulate sense of insecurity, breeds anxiety and compel the opponent to increase its military power (Tang, 2009)- provides impetus for qualitative changes and nuclear weapons development. Indian favoured conventional asymmetry and vertical nuclear proliferation heightens Islamabad's security dilemma. Pakistan's reliance on nuclear deterrent increased to deter conventionally strong Indian armed forces and preserve country's territorial sovereignty. Nuclear deterrent preserved regional peace and maintained status-quo. Inferences can be drawn that nuclear weapons are thus weapons of peace. Second, self-help helps states to survive in international system.

This paper aims to underline literature available on nuclear pro/ non-proliferation, development of the NPT and India-Pakistan nuclear weapons developments. This academic research highlights how nuclear proliferation in South Asia challenges future of the NPT.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This section highlights efforts beginning in the Cold War era to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. How, these efforts continued in post Cold War and India-Pakistan nuclear tests in May, 1998. A conference was convened in Moscow on December 16, 1945(Milestones: 1945-1952, 1945) representative from the Great Britain, Soviet Union and United States (US) decided to establish a body under United Nations (UN). The body was proposed to dismantle all radioactive material and nuclear weapons. The development of the NPT, its current shape and mechanism is by-product of a long historical and gradual process. The roots of the NPT can be traced to Moscow conference.

Hans Blix (Blix, 2011) highlighted significance and the process of developing the NPT. Blix discusses the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the agency's safeguards mechanism. Article III of the NPT laid foundations for the development of an institution (IAEA) to ensure implementation of safeguards mechanism.

Available literature on proliferation and nuclear weapons development is in huge amount. Subject specialists have used diverse research practices to verify their case. Techniques include theories of nuclear proliferation (Hymans, 2006), Scott D. Sagan (Sagan, 1996-1997) applied various techniques, nuclear domino theory (Ladha, 2012), Frey asserts external security threats known as traditional threats necessitate statesmen to decide nuclear weapons development(Frey, 2006). Kenneth N. Waltz ascertains nuclear deterrent thwarts external threats and preserves strategic stability (Waltz, 1981). Hans Blix and Sverre Lodgaard in their study highlights global community's efforts started in Cold War era to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

Lodgaard endeavors to explain that during Cold War nuclear weapons were integral parts of military plannings, exercises and war fighting doctrines. Lodgaard's research significant point is weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have continuing relevance in post Cold War era. In new millennium WMDs have profound impact of on international strategic stability. Blix and Lodgaard's study central theme is proliferation of nuclear weapons is continuing problem. In their seminal work they have divided the trend of nuclear proliferation into three sections. First, nuclear weapons states (NWS) failed to pursue dialogues to thwart efforts to modernize nuclear weapons rather dismantles stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the light of Article VI of the NPT (INFCIRC/140, 1970). Lack of interest in implementing Article VI prevented international community to achieve goal of nuclear non-proliferation against the spirit of arms control efforts. NWS contrary to Article VI continued to modernize delivery mechanism of nuclear weapons. Prior to mentioning the second reason it is important to state that efforts to modernize existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons is known as vertical proliferation. In their view second problem to the NPT is posed by non-signatories to the treaty or the hold out nuclear capable states. Substance of the matter is NPT is challenged from outside. Third problem in the list categorized by Blix and Lodgaard is dangers posed by the NPT signatories' tendency to cheat international community by diverting peaceful nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons. It is labeled as violation of the NPT resulting in posing internal challenges to non-proliferation mechanism.

India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation Case

India-Pakistan post nuclear weapons development case resulting in nuclear arms race is analysed by Bhumitra Chakma in an article. Chakma believes ongoing arms race is by-product of three essential reasons. First, South Asian nuclear states are increasing stockpiles of fissile material, WMDs and related delivery mechanism. Continued vertical proliferation resulted from their fear that international community is making efforts to obstruct credibility of their deterrent postures(Chakma, 2010).India-Pakistan disregards for implementing arms control measures is also rooted in their turbulent history, continued hostility, wars, military crises enhancing security dilemma and mutual threat perception.

New Delhi enjoys conventional asymmetry vis-à-vis Islamabad. Bulk of Indian conventional forces deployed near Pakistani border heightens Pakistan's security dilemma. It requires the latter to amalgamate nuclear weapons with conventional weapons to preserve the status-quo. Lack of trust and political tension is constant feature of South Asia's strategic landscape. Chakma prescribes normalization of India-Pakistan relations is key to workable arms control efforts.

Ken Berry (Berry & others, 2010)case study highlights Russian and Pakistani nuclear adversaries North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)- India are enjoying strategic advantages vis-a-vis both. Further, conventional asymmetry favors NATO and India. Realist teachings suggest Moscow and Islamabad reliance on nuclear deterrent will continue to overcome strategic asymmetry and thwart misadventures of nuclear capable hostile neighbours.

Lodgaard concludes South Asian strategic environment is competitive (Lodgaard, 2011) due to India's hegemonic behaviour and intensions to dominate at the regional level. Indian coercive policies have been rebuffed by geographically small and economically weak Pakistan. India has not stopped pressuring Pakistan to accept it as a regional policeman and receive dictations. Lodgaard, Islamabad is working on the notion of self-help by utilizing internal resources and relying on nuclear deterrent to achieve parity with New Delhi and preserve sovereign status(Lodgaard, 2011).Lodgaard ascertains under 123 Agreement India is receiving preferential treatment by US. Particular deal alone endows New Delhi to enhance its capabilities to produce additional stockpiles of fissile material. The agreement enables India to produce 50 nuclear weapons per year. Pakistan efforts to achieve parity with India would become counterproductive. South Asian strategic asymmetry will also turn in India's favour.

Sino-India border conflict obliges New Delhi to receive conventional military support, assistance in nuclear realm from international community particularly the West. Combine support from the West endows South Asian state to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces. China is declared as a primary threat to Indian sovereignty (Lodgaard, 2011)ironically these forces are deployed along with Pakistani border. Military modernization programme and military doctrine including Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), Joint Warfare Doctrine and Land Warfare Doctrine are designed to deal with threats from Islamabad. Kashmir is viewed as nuclear flashpoint by Lodgaard in his concluding remarks.

Walter C. Ladwing, III discussing South Asian strategic stability seems restless because of CSD(III, 2007/08). Quick advances to invade Pakistan are prescribed as primary objective to accrue military goals in future wars. It ignores Pakistan's defined redlines/ nuclear threshold. Pakistan countermeasures can result in use of nuclear weapons against enemy forces. Fear of rapid hostile advancing enemy forces heavily deployed Pakistani border further pave the way for nuclear weapons use. It will provide excuse to New Delhi to authorize nuclear strikes at massive level against Pakistan. Inference drawn by the authors is CSD is detrimental for South Asian strategic stability and regional peace cannot be preserved if this offensive doctrine is authorized.

James M. Acton study highlights linkages between international system and ongoing strategic rivalry resulting in nuclear proliferation in South Asia (Acton, 2012). Beijing policy of military modernization, research and developments in military realm exacerbates New Delhi's security dilemma. Geographically large, economically gigantic and huge military budget naturally heightens India's preexistent security dilemma resulting in nuclearization of the Indian Ocean by New Delhi. Deployment of nuclear forces on submarines is attempted to acquire second strike capability against Peoples Republic of China (PRC) armed forces. This move forces Sino-Pakistan security circles to respond in similar way. However, Chinese countermeasures are viewed obstruction to global arms control efforts and potential threat by Russian and American security circles. Action-reaction syndrome is known as systematic dilemma and increases strategic value of nuclear deterrent.

The Development of the Indian Nuclear Bomb

Significant aspect of this academic research is to highlight how India-Pakistan nuclear weapons programmes are challenging the NPT from outside. Critical study of India's nuclear weapons programme affirms that in 1948, Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru laid foundations of WMDs programme in

the guise of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. India's first Atomic Energy Act (IAEC)(Sethna)was cornerstone of this significant military milestone. Pakistani decision making circles ignored gigantic strategic development. Nehru's public rhetoric regarding peaceful nuclear technology and abhorrence for nuclear weapons programme(Ending Nuclear Testing) convinced Pakistani security establishment to ignore nuclear threat on its borders. Nehru also laid the second feature of Indian WMDs programme "nuclear opacity," by publically denouncing utility of nuclear deterrent.

In 1948, newly independent states of South Asia went to war over Kashmir. Nehru draw conclusion that Indian failure to deter Pakistani tribesmen led to the creation of Azad Kashmir. Nehru enactment of IAEC opened the door of nuclear weapons development for India and laid blueprint for strategic planning. On the occasion he stated that "if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way," (Arpi, 2010). Nehru in his statement highlighted three vital features first, in case of external threats to Indian mainland India will start developing nuclear weapons. Second, in pursuit to ensure Indian sovereignty compromise on WMDs development is out of question. Third, future governments will decide the fate of WMDs programme in accordance with the aspirations of Indian masses rather than international society. Authors conclude Nehru was clear on development of nuclear weapons therefore he politicized Indian nuclear programme.

Nehru's close aide Dr. Homi Bhaba was closely monitoring international community's nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Bhaba a nuclear scientist advised Nehru to avoid issuing public statements regarding nuclear weapons development(Gupt, 2007). He feared that the non-proliferation community in its efforts to prevent Indian WMDs development with stop transfer of nuclear technology, material and know-how to India. Indian nuclear scientist reached this conclusion from Nehru's rhetoric on nuclear weapons development.

Indian government's countermeasures to foil international community's non-proliferation efforts had been the development of the Department of Atomic Research in India (Ganguly, Spring, 1999).Nehru took this decision on August 3, 1954 to get dual-use nuclear technology and start rapid progress on WMDs.

Key takeaway gleaned from Bhaba's efforts is first Bhaba laid significant pillar of Indian nuclear weapons programme, "nuclear opacity." Opaque nature enabled India to become threshold state and divert peaceful nuclear programme towards weaponization. Bhaba is credited to become the architect of "nuclear weaponization." Claude Arpi believes that India became threshold state in 1954 (Arpi, 2010). In 1956, Nehru informed the Indian parliament that "if resources were delivered, an India bomb could be made in three or four years," (Suryanarayan, 2010). Perkovich claims that Prime Minister Nehru and Dr. Bhaba together created Indian nuclear establishment authority. It was decided by them to get nuclear technology divert the course of nuclear programme to reprocess spent fuel and procure weapon grade plutonium (Perkovich, 2001).In conclusion India in 1956 decided to pursue plutonium route for WMDs development. Critical overview of Indian security environment in post independence era reveals that the decision to develop nuclear programme was merely prestige driven. Indian decision makers wanted to join elite club of nuclear haves to be recognized as great power by members of international community.

Creation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 threatened Nehru-Bhaba nuclear proliferation efforts. Creation of IAEA was responded with appointment of Dr. Bhaba as supreme authority of Indian nuclear programme in 1958(Plutonium Reprocessing Plant, 2001).Indian armed forces humiliating defeat in 1962 border skirmishes with China(Abitol), aspirations to join great powers club and make Indian armed forces invincible became driving forces to actively pursue nuclear weapons development programme. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in 1962 criticized Indian nuclear policy stating that "eunuch government... in its ahimsic idiocy for the criminal folly of not pursuing nuclear weapons," (Vikram, 2008). In 1964, the situation worsened for Indian government due to domestic critique and Chinese nuclear tests(Paul, 1998).Changes in Indian external strategic environment, conventionally strong and nuclear capable China posed challenges to Indian territorial border and national security. It necessitated response from India.

Indian government continued to maintain strict control over nuclear weapons programme and laid the fourth feature "rigid nuclear culture." Verifiable data proves that in 1964, India acquired the ability to

reprocess thirty tons of plutonium at Trombay reprocessing plant per annum. Weapons grade fissile material produced at Trombay reprocessing plant was utilized in Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). In 1964, Indian Prime Minister Shastri permitted Dr. Bhaba to develop WMDs (Leonard S. Spector, 1990).Decision was taken in violation of international community's arms control and disarmament efforts to prevent proliferation of deadly weapons. Global community was also involved in efforts to develop international regime for containing spread of nuclear weapons. It led to the development of NPT. India violated the newly devised international community in two distinct groups and unless China signs it. However, it did not make rhetoric to develop WMDs. Path to proliferation continued to recover from feelings of humiliation suffered at the hands of China. On May 18, 1974 India tested first nuclear devices code name as Smiling Budha 4 (Lee, 2006). Experts believe Indira Gandhi authorized nuclear tests because of the politico-economic crisis at the domestic level. Hence attempt was made to divert attention of Indian masses from domestic problems. Broader objectives remained to tighten Indira's grip on domestic affairs, continue to rule the country and gain prestige in international community.

Tight control, opaque nature and secrecy over nuclear weapons programme was well maintained as issues concerning WMDs deterrent role, doctrine, size and structure were never discussed by politicomilitary officials in public.

Nuclear Weapons Development by Pakistan

Political crisis resulting in civil war in East Pakistan led to Indian blatant involvement resulting in dismemberment of Pakistan(Squassoni, 2005), Indian nuclear tests in 1974, conventional and strategic imbalance exacerbated Pakistan's preexistent security dilemma. Dismemberment affirmed Pakistani strategic planners' perception that India posing existential threat wants to undo the partition of the subcontinent. Development of nuclear deterrent was viewed as a sole option against Indian future misadventures and interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs (MoeedYousaf & Pandya, 2010).Realists' perspective explains Pakistan's decision for nuclear weapons proliferation was security driven. Changes in external security milieu necessitated WMDs development to preserve Pakistan's sovereignty. The traditional notion of security to thwart threats and restore balance of power played pivotal role in Pakistan's case. Sagan asserts nuclear proliferation begets nuclear proliferation as nuclear threats can only be deterred with nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996-1997).

Genesis of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, conventional and nuclear asymmetry is traced to Indian nuclear tests conducted in May, 1974. However, in post nuclearised era Indian strategic planners were suspicious and worried about Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. From Sagan's perspective Pakistan's developments in nuclear weapons program throughout 1980s and 1990s had been natural course. Following Indian route to WMDs development secrecy and water tight control became pillars of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. The tit-for-tat nuclear proliferation intensified mutual sense of threat perception, insecurity, mutual trust deficit. Continued proliferation deprived the NPT from becoming universally accepted treaty. Horizontal proliferation continued to fracture established norms of the non-proliferation.

Prime Minister Vjpayee led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government tested nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, 1998(Maerli & Lodgaard, 2007).Indian ruling elite knew nuclear tests have changed strategic balance in India's favour therefore started dictating Pakistan (Ashraf). They warned the later of severe consequences incase former's dictations are not followed. Vajpayee warning Pakistan asserted, "Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world [and] roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir," (Cooper, 1998). L. K. Advani the then high ranking government official held Islamabad responsible for providing assistance to Kashmiri fighters. Advani warned of carrying Indian military operations across Line of Control (LOC) in Pakistani Kashmir (Iype, 1998). Islamabad was facing intense pressure from non-proliferation community demanding to refrain from nuclear tests. However, New Delhi's clear intentions to redraw South Asia's strategic and geographical landscape and existential threat resulted in nuclear tests on May 28, 1998(Medalia, 2011). Countermove restored BOP and preserved sanctity of Pakistan's borders. Pakistani Prime Minister stated

that "we never wanted to participate in this nuclear race," (1998: World fury at Pakistan's Nuclear Tests, 1998).South Asian neighbors' decisions to develop WMDs had contrary objectives e.g. New Delhi aspired to acquire recognition as an emerging power. It was a prestige driven case. Contrarily Islamabad's decision has roots in national security requirements primarily to deter external interference in its domestic affairs. Further, nuclear deterrent thwarts military aggression vis-à-vis Pakistan. Nuclear weapons coerced New Delhi to maintain policy of restraint as misadventure can lead result in mutual suicide. Nuclear signaling has preserved strategic stability and peace in the region.

Permanent 5 individually, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Group of 8 (G8) advanced countries criticized nuclear tests (Scheinman). International community appealed both states to halt future nuclear tests. Proponents of nuclear zero urged both states to take practical steps for the resolution of Kashmir dispute, instantly discontinue progress and deployment of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation activists demanded India-Pakistan to support global community in preventing nuclear proliferation by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB).

South Asian Nuclear Milieu Challenges the NPT

In new millennium non-proliferation activists have changed their approach to India-Pakistan by successfully de-hyphanating India from Pakistan. Islamabad is criticized for horizontal proliferation and threats are associated with its nuclear programme. Washington helped India to join Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Efforts are underway to accommodate India in Zangger Committee, the Australia Group and UNSC. It legitimized New Delhi's nuclear weapons programme by signing the 123 nuclear Accord. The NSG granted special wavier to India to pave the way for signing nuclear agreements with Britain, France, Germany, Australia, US, Russia, and Japan. Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). Preferential treatment and open access to international nuclear market endows New Delhi to divert domestic fissile material for developing additional stockpiles of nuclear war heads. Indian strategic planners have affirmed these fears by nuclearizing the Indian Ocean. This nuclear assistance is provided in the pretext of Article IV of the NPT. It ensures states access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes. Data proves misinterpretation of the Article contributed to vertical proliferation. Consequentially, NWS have violated Article I of the treaty NNWS members of the NSG have violated Article II of the NPT by carrying out nuclear commerce with New Delhi.

Conclusion drawn highlights banning Pakistan's entry to MTCR, NSG, in Zangger Committee, the Australia Group and UNSC is rejection of Islamabad's stance. The non-proliferation regime rooted in the NPT is deliberately endangered. Exceptions are widening conventional and nuclear asymmetries in Indian favour. Pakistan is coerced to intensify its reliance on nuclear deterrent, follow Indian suit to introduce qualitative and quantitative improvements, increase fissile material production and introduce reliable deliveries mechanisms. It heightens Indian security dilemma further intensifying Indian pace of horizontal nuclear proliferation, arms race spiral and doctrinal changes are introduced to prepared Indian forces to fight in nuclear, chemical and biological environments. Short range nuclear capable missiles introduced by Indian, additional stockpiles of nuclear arsenals amalgamated with conventional weapons and tendency to adopt nuclear first use policy is lowering nuclear threshold. Chances of deliberate or inadvertent nuclear weapons use have increased not only in war rather in crisis situations. Discriminatory policies and blank cheque issued to India endangers future of the NPT.

The NSG and Washington in particular have denied Pakistan's access to nuclear technology and material. The Group failed to grasp reason, nature and purpose of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development to deter regional hegemon by relying on nuclear deterrent.

Contrarily, India is receiving preferential treatment. NSG forgot that it was primarily created in opposition to Indian nuclear tests in 1974 as New Delhi changed course of peaceful nuclear technology to e.g. enrich Uranium, reprocess spent fuel and acquire weapons grade Plutonium for developing nuclear weapons. Direction is being set for future proliferation geographically large states can choose to withdraw from the treaty and develop nuclear weapons expecting preferential treatment and technology from NSG, MTCR and US in particular. Indian case of preferential treatment will encourage technologically advance threshold states to violate Article II of the NPT.

South Asian nuclear rivals are not signatories of the NPT therefore decision to proliferate did not violate any law. India-Pakistan claims to have become NWS brought the treaty under great stress (Scheinman). NWS status violated the spirit of Article IX of the near universal treaty. Article IX asserts that a state which manufactured and tested nuclear device before January 1, 1967 is NWS (INFCIRC/140, 1970). Naturally, neither India nor Pakistan are dejure NWS. Condition set by the NPT prevents both South Asian nuclear rivals to join the treaty as dejure NWS. The non-proliferation community, proponents of arms control and disarmament therefore lamented overt nuclear tests of May 1998. International community viewed India-Pakistan nuclear tests as a challenge to Article IX of the treaty hence refused to accept both as NWS. Ashley J. Tellis and Vinod Kumar have suggested to incorporate India as dejure NWS by amending Article VIII the NPT. It is difficult and long process. Proposed amendment has to be submitted to the depository governments to circulate it among member countries for convening conference to discuss it. Successful amendment requires majority votes from depository governments (INFCIRC/140, 1970), consent of 1/3 or majority of signatories and vote from IAEA Board of Governors. Incorporating India in the NPT would be a major blow to Article VIII. Primary cause to limit number of NWS to five would be undermined naturally fracturing non-proliferation objective. Tellis and Kumar wants NPT depository states, non-proliferation community and arms control and disarmament activists to forget the goal of dismantling nuclear weapons. Contrarily, their objective is to ensure NSG's additional concessions in addition to recognize India as legitimate NWS. Acknowledging their suggestion means spirit of nuclear zero to make the world free of nuclear weapons, to regulate unsafeguarded nuclear material and excommunicate proliferating state would be violated. Potential proliferating states would be encouraged that nuclear proliferation contains inherited rewards rather than punishment.

Amendment to the NPT threatens international peace, strategic stability and security. Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) and technologically advanced threshold states signatories to the NPT will raise questions over utility of why forgo nuclear weapons development option and acceding to the NPT. The threshold states decision to quit the NPT by exercising Article X (INFCIRC/140, 1970)change course of peaceful nuclear technology to WMDs development and join members of the nuclear club is not distant. Allowing India to join the NPT as a NWS can result in chain nuclear proliferation reaction leading to nuclear anarchy. Key takeaway gleaned from the above paragraph is extending the cut-off date would lead to the collapse of the NPT.

India-Pakistan Refusal to Join the NPT

Collapse of the NPT prevents South Asian arch nuclear rivals to join it as dejure NWS. NPT lacks institutional measures to bring both states into the mainstream. Non-signatories to the NPT on different occasions have refused to relinquish their WMDs programmes and join the accord as NNWS. In 2000 India's External Affairs Minister stated that signatories to the NPT must understand New Delhi cannot joint the treaty as a NNWS(Kumar, 2010). In 2009, Indian Permanent representative to UN in reply to UNSCR 1887 out rightly refused to sign the treaty as NNWS. Conventional imbalance and existential threats bars Islamabad from joining the NPT as NNWS. Islamabad's decades old stance to join NPT was conditional to New Delhi's joining of the agreement. However, in February, 2012 Abdul Basit Pakistan Foreign Office Spokesman announced change in Pakistan's decades old stance stating that "we cannot sign the treaty. We cannot give up nuclear weapons." Basit added that "if you have conventional imbalance between Pakistan and India, then obviously our reliance on nuclear weapons increases correspondingly," (Pakistan Rules Out, 2010). Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary on June 3, 2015 reiterated Islamabad newly adopted stance on signing the NPT. Chaudhry during negotiation with US Officials stated that NPT discriminatory nature bars Islamabad from joining it (Iqbal, 2015). Despite categorical rejection of the NPT the treaty does not offer any incentive to South Asian non-signatories. Joining as NNWS therefore is out of question. India outside the NPT is being accepted as NWS. This out of the box solution is strengthening Indian case at the cost of weakening the NPT to be steadily accommodated in the treaty.

CONCLUSION

NSG members, US and India are weakening non-proliferation from within for vested economic interests. Theories of proliferation conclude states develop WMDs to deter external aggression. Decision and continued reliance on nuclear deterrent ensures sanctity of Pakistan's borders. Dream of the NPT universalization can be achieved by addressing Pakistan's security concerns rather than exacerbating them by increasing New Delhi's capacity to produce additional stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Equal treatment and addressing security concerns of Pakistan is key to universalization of the NPT.

Strategic stability is endangered because of Indian gradual application of first use policy and refusal to provide negative security assurances to Pakistan. Capabilities rather than benign intentions matter it prevents Islamabad from adopting flexible nuclear response vis-à-vis India. Pakistan continued reliance on nuclear deterrent is natural response. Security dilemma, nuclear arms race, missile testing and deployments permanent features of South Asia are weakening the NPT. Ongoing rivalry is encouraging weak states to follow the suit. Washington's efforts to adjust Indian in the NPT, UNSC, NSG Wavier and entry into MTCR is viewed as a reward granted to New Delhi for testing nuclear devices. New Delhi's entry into the NPT as NWS will open the gates of nuclear anarchy. Preferential treatment of India is weakening the NPT and non-proliferation efforts.

REFERENCES

- 1998: World fury at Pakistan's Nuclear Tests. (1998, May 28). Retrieved June 26, 2012, from BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/28/newsid 2495000/2495045.stm
- Abitol, A. D. (n.d.). *Cause of the 1962 Sino-Indian War*. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume/volume1_abitbol.pdf
- Acton, J. M. (2012, Spring). Bombs Away? Being Realistic about Deep Nuclear Reductions. *The Washington Quarterly*, 40.
- Arpi, C. (2010). France and Nuclear Disarmament between Vision and Realism. *Indian Defence Review*, 25 (4), 133.
- Ashraf, F. (n.d.). *Post-9/11 Trends in Indian Foreign Policy*. Retrieved JUne 26, 2012, from The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad: http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=220
- Berry, K., & others, a. (2010). Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence. Monterey Institute on International Studies.
- Blix, H. (2011). Introduction: The Present Nuclear Order, How It Came About, Why It May Not Last. In e. Olav Njolstad, *Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.* New York: Routledge.
- Chakma, B. (2010). Nuclear Arms Control Challenges in South Asia. India Review, 365, 366.
- Cooper, K. J. (1998, May 19). key Indian Official Warns Pakistan. Retrieved June 27, 2012, from Washington Post Foreign Service: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/southasia/stories/indiawarn051998.htm
- *Ending Nuclear Testing.* (n.d.). Retrieved April 27, 2012, from United Nations: http://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/history.shtml
- Frey, K. (2006). India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security. Oxon: Routledge.
- Ganguly, S. (Spring, 1999). India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program. *International Security*, 23 (4), 151.
- Gupt, M. K. (2007). *Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Major Legal Issues*. Master of Philosophy thesis, JawaharLal Nehru University.
- Hymans, J. E. (2006). Theories of Nuclear Proliferation. The Nonproliferation Review, 13 (3), 455-465.
- III, W. C. (2007/08). A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine. International Security, 32 (3), 158-159.
- *INFCIRC/140.* (1970, April 22). Retrieved November 1, 2015, from International Atomic Energy Agency, Information

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf

- Iqbal, A. (2015, June 3). Pakistan Will Not Sign NPT, Says Foreign Secretary. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from Dawn News: http://www.dawn.com/news/1185843
- Iype, G. (1998, May 25). Advani Wants troops to Strike AcrossLoC to Quell Proxy War in Kashmir. Retrieved June 27, 2012, from Rediff: http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/25geo.htm
- Kumar, A. V. (2010, January 1). *Reforming the NPT to Include India*. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: http://thebulletin.org/reforming-npt-include-india
- Ladha, R. (2012, Spring). A Regional Arms Race? Testing the Nuclear Domino Theory in the Middle East. *Al Nakhlah*, 1.
- Lee, I. (2006, November 1). *The Smiling Buddha Blast & Canada's CANDU Snafu*. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Briarpatch: http://www.ingmarlee.com/news/20-warmongers-cabal/86-the-smiling-buddha-blast-a-canadas-candu-snafu.pdf
- Leonard S. Spector, w. J. (1990). Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-90. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- Lodgaard, S. (2011). Nuclear Disarmament and Non-ProliferationTowards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World. New York: Routledge.
- Maerli, M. B., & Lodgaard, S. (2007). Nuclear Proliferation and International Security. New York: Routledge.
- Medalia, J. (2011). Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments. Congressional Research Service.
- *Milestones: 1945-1952.* (1945). Retrieved November 1, 2015, from U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/baruch-plans
- MoeedYousaf, & Pandya, A. (2010, August 6). The Quest for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia: A Reality Check. *United States Institute of Peace*, 1.
- Pakistan Rules Out Joining Nonproliferation Treaty. (2010, February 23). Retrieved November 7, 2015, from Global Security Newsire: http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-rules-out-joiningnonproliferation-treaty/
- Paul, T. (1998, Fall). The Bases of India's Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 5.
- Perkovich, G. (2001). *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*. California: California University Press.
- Plutonium Reprocessing Plant. (2001, September 1). Retrieved November 11, 2014, from NTI: http://www.nti.org/facilities/858/
- Sagan, S. D. (1996-1997). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. *International Security, 21* (3).
- Scheinman, L. (n.d.). *Challenges in South Asia To NonProliferation Regimes*. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from CNS: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op3/schein.htm
- Sethna, D. H. India's Atomic Energy Programme-Past and Future. IAEA Bulletin, 2 (5), 1.
- Squassoni, S. (2005). India and Pakistan Nuclear Weapons. CRS.
- Suryanarayan, V. (2010, March 11). *Reflection on India's Nuclear Policy During the Nehru Era*. Retrieved January 9, 2015, from Eurasia Review: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.indian/C9jebSwmd5k
- Tang, S. (2009). The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis. Security Studies, 592.
- Vikram, V. (2008). Lotus and the Dragon. IPCS. New Delhi: IPCS.
- Waltz, K. N. (1981). The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Papers, 171.