

WAR AND REGIME SURVIVAL: A CASE STUDY OF THE AFGHAN WAR OF 1980S

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ABSTRACT

In traditional terms when we talk about a link between war and regime survival, we find ourselves in the realm of domestic politics. It is well documented that the leaders use diversionary force to exploit the domestic audience. However, in this study, we argue that, depending on their level of dependence on the external sources of power, leaders may also use force to impress upon the external audience to extract moral and material support for the survival of their regimes. Here, we find strong evidence of a link between domestic and external factors in the context of the superpowers and their clients. In other words, we emphasize the dynamics of in-group/out-group hypothesis of the diversionary use of force to the alliance behavior of the superpowers and their clients.

Keywords: Legitimacy, Pattern-Client Relationship, Alliances, Superpower, Cold War, Third World.

INTRODUCTION

War is the most effective tool for making a common cause with the external powers, especially when it is directed against the target that is also considered to be a menace by those powers. (Fox, 2021) Such wars help leaders of the recipient states to legitimately acquire weapons and financial support, which help them to strengthen their position against both the external and internal threats to their regimes. Owing to these benefits accruing from war, state leaders will be inclined to prolong that war for the maintenance and strengthening of their regimes, in addition to seek security for their states.

In terms of the diversionary use of force, most of the studies focus on the democratic countries, with the implicit assumption about priority of the domestic sources of power (Hamourtziadou et al., 2021). This approach utterly ignores the major sources of the external factors in the domestic politics of the countries, especially Third World dictatorships. In this study, I deal with a war in which authoritarian regimes were involved on both sides of the conflict, which heavily depended on the external sources of power for their survival. This development provided the authoritarian regimes an incentive to continue the conflict to keep major powers engaged in sustaining their regimes.

In this paper, we attempt to give a new dimension to the issues of 'regime type' and 'cost-benefit calculations' on the part of state leadership to get involved in international conflict behavior. To accomplish this goal, the following research hypothesis is suggested.

A war will last longer if authoritarian regimes are involved in it and the cost of that war is paid by the third parties.

This hypothesis suggests that since the authoritarian regimes do not depend on the general masses for their political support, they look for the other sources of power for their survival. In less dependent authoritarian countries, these 'other' sources might include some domestic influential groups. However, in the context of the Third World countries, due to the lack of their domestic resources and resultant dependent nature, mostly the sources of power

are external, either a regional actor or international institutions. (Ichord, 2020) One of the likely possibilities for such sources is an external big power. However, these external powers have their own interests and they will help such authoritarian regimes only if they make a common cause with them. (Timoneda, 2020) If a war tends to be the common cause for the sustenance of the client-patron relationship, these authoritarian regimes will be more likely to initiate or continue that war effort in order to engage the patron. In other words, use of force by the client state against an opponent state or an opponent alliance enhances alliance (or group) cohesion between the client and its patron. This hypothesis implicitly embodies the conditions under which leaders will exploit a war for the dual goal of their own survival and the security of their countries.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this paper, we contend realist and neorealist theory on three grounds. First, unlike the assertions of the neorealist theory about the systemic focus on the foreign policy making, we argue that the decisions of the foreign policy makers are based on a number of factors, encompassing both domestic and international dynamics. So, in order to accurately explain these decisions, one must consider both levels of analysis. Second, and related to first, unlike taking state as a unitary actor, focus should be on the leadership of the state, which makes the connection between external and internal factors. In this respect, we agree with David (David, 1991, p. 237) who argues that realism should be expanded to include both internal and external threats to the state leadership, and resultantly “the leader of the state rather than the state itself should used as the level of analysis.” Third, since realist theory elucidates interstate conflict and alignment, it fails to explain “the nexus between great power competition and regional rivalries in the Third World,” (Kinsella D, 1995, p. 121) which contributes in determining the nature, initiation and duration of the war. Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson also reject the emphasis of realism that actions of the states are dictated by external, structural considerations. They argue that “the choice of goals and actions is given shape by the domestic agenda of the leadership, as well as by the feasibility constraints of the external environment... their foreign policy goals may be seen as endogenous to their domestic political concerns rather than just to the international system’s structure.” (De Mesquita, 1995, p. 843)

There is a rich amount of literature that deals with the linkage between domestic and international politics. Although, it is difficult to organize this literature in strict categories, Heldt mentions following three versions of this relationship. According to him, in the face of domestic discontent, leaders attempt to: 1) “divert public frustration and aggression toward and outside target,” 2) “lessen domestic discontent and increase domestic cohesion by creating a perception of an outside threat,” and 3) “achieve foreign policy success to increase domestic popularity.” (Heldt, 1999) Heldt also mentions that different “labels such as scapegoating, externalization, diversion, and in-group/out-group hypotheses are interchangeably used to denote these versions”. (Heldt, 1999, p. 454) Since most of the studies in this literature use the term ‘diversionary use of force,’ I employ the same term to refer to this all-encompassing phenomenon (with different versions) mentioned by. (Heldt, 1999) Main origin of this theory is from the sociological literature on group theory, which postulates that group cohesion can be increased through conflict with an external group. (Trebbi & Weese, 2019) Empirical evidence on these propositions is mixed. Some studies (especially about US foreign policy) find positive relationship between domestic discontent and use of force, while others find negative relationship. Some studies, especially quantitative ones, do not find any relationship at all, while others find a curvilinear relation, where domestic support of the leader increases at a certain level of discontent and during certain period of his rule, while it drops afterwards. (DiLorenzo, 2019)

First major assumption of the studies dealing with the war and domestic politics is that political leaders are *rational actors*, who are intent to keep themselves in power and use all the available resources and tools to accomplish this goal. (Pierzchalski, 2020) In both authoritarian and democratic regimes “the clique of leaders who can count on support from majority of the relevant resources-whether they be guns, dollars, or votes-can expect to win office and retain it”. (De Mesquita, 1995, p. 843) In dealing with the neorealist assumption that states maximize

their power to maximize their security, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (De Mesquita, 1995) argue that “a leader’s search for the security of the state intertwines with the search for the policies that will maintain the leader in power against domestic opposition”. (De Mesquita, *War and the Fate of Regimes: A comparative Analysis.*, 1992, p. 853)

The second important assumption is that the leaders are subject to removal, and they “recognize the existence of opposition and design of others on the office they hold” (De Mesquita, 1995, p. 842), which is possible through the mechanism of elections or coups. Here, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson mention only elections or coups mainly because they assume that only the domestic groups are the main base for the power of a leader, and leaders, one way or another, can be held accountable by the groups that helped them come to power. (De Mesquita, 1995) In this paper, I argue that in the context of the Third World countries, external groups (especially superpowers) can also have a stake in removing leaders of certain regimes from power, depending on conflict of interest between leaders and the external powers and the level of dependence between the two.

Some studies on the topic made distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes and found contradictory evidence. Gelpi (Gelpi, 1997), for example, found that leaders of the democratic countries use force to divert public attention during the time when domestic conditions are bad. While, since it is easier for the authoritarian regimes to suppress domestic discontent, they tend not to use force for diversionary purposes. He argues, for authoritarian regimes “attacking the demonstrators will be less costly than attacking another state”. (Gelpi, 1997, p. 261) Authoritarian leaders need all military assets to use force for suppression purposes. Moreover, according to Gelpi, “rally effect may be diminished in nondemocratic states because the public’s identification with the state may be weaker than it is in democracies.” (Gelpi, 1997, p. 261)

Here, we propose the possibility that authoritarian regimes might want to use force to divert attention of external powers, on whose support these regimes depend to stay in power. On the issue of regime type, unlike previous studies, we propose two new categories of authoritarian regimes; successfully repressive authoritarian regimes and unsuccessfully repressive authoritarian regimes. By proposing these categories, Iwe explicitly reject propositions of those authors who take authoritarian regime as a monolithic category, where it is assumed that all such regimes will or can suppress domestic discontent. In a way, our categories are extensions on Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson’s category of highly repressive regime. (De Mesquita, 1995) In doing so, I disagree with Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson’s assumption that highly repressive regimes will always be successful in suppressing domestic discontent. (De Mesquita, 1995) We argue that more use of repression by a regime shows that that regime faces severe domestic challenge to its authority and legitimacy, than less repressive regime. Resultantly, such authoritarian regime, especially in the Third World context, is less successful domestically, and is more likely to be dependent on the external sources of power than less suppressive regime.

In reaching these conclusions, David does not reject realist assumptions about the role of power, interests, rationality, presence of objective laws that are based on human nature, and hierarchical nature of issues, ‘with survival being the most important.’ However, he combines these assumptions with those he formulates in terms of the Third World countries. He assumes that Third World leaders are “weak and illegitimate” because of the hostile domestic and international environment. Hostility of the Third World environment owes to the fact that, unlike advanced countries which evolved over the centuries, Third World countries were created by the colonial powers, mostly without consideration of ethnic, cultural or religious considerations. This condition not only created enemies at the borders of these countries, but also different competing groups developed within the countries. (David, 1991)

We contend that leaders of both Third World countries as well as those of superpowers seek their own interests. A client-patron relation establishes only when their interests merge. (Magyar, Madlovics, & Ledeneva, 2020) War against the opponent alliance seems to be a promising factor for the cohesive relationship between two such states.

So far, we have dealt with the question of why the superpowers and their clients will seek alliance? Now we turn to the question, what is the nature of this alliance and does it have

any implications for the domestic politics of the client states? Dealing with the big powers' role in the regional conflicts, most of the studies (Kinsella D, 1995), (Maniruzzaman, 1992) identify the arms transfer by the big powers as the major determinant in linking the regional conflict with the superpower competition. In this respect, (Kinsella D, 1995) study is most comprehensive and insightful in dealing with the interaction of the superpowers and the Third World countries. It has been suggested by Kinsella that conflict in the Third World, in which superpowers are involved, is in part "an externalization of the superpower competition to the safer arenas". (Kinsella D, 1995, p. 110) Kinsella identifies that "arms flow provides a useful empirical referent since they have been identified as the primary mechanism through which the Cold War penetrated regional security complexes". (Kinsella D, 1995, p. 110) Through these arms transfers the hegemonic pattern gets established by the superpowers. The dynamics of this arms transfer involve both political and strategic considerations. He explains, "the competition inherent in the superpowers' arms supply patterns is relevant to both domestic and interstate relations in the Third World." It may involve securing "the status of an established regime against some internal threat, especially when the source of that threat derived political and/or material support from the rival superpower". (Kinsella D, 1995, p. 111)

Afghan war as a case study

Afghan war is a classical example that encompasses most of the theoretical concerns discussed in the previous section. It was a long war that lasted for almost ten years. It was a war that involved superpowers, (Kagan, 2012) the factor that resulted in the establishment of the client-patron relationship on both sides of the war parties. Since, my query in this paper is to elaborate cost-benefit analysis of the war, from the point of view of the client states, and the dependence of these regimes on the war effort, following will be my empirical hypothesis for this paper:

Authoritarian regimes in Pakistan and Afghanistan (in 1980s), being dependent on US and USSR aid respectively for their political survival are likely to engage in a war, that also serves the interests of the super powers, to keep their respective patrons engaged with themselves. These regimes will also resist peaceful solution of the war, because the resultant disengagement of the major powers will lead to the loss of support on which their own survival depends.

Afghan War and Establishment of the Client-Patron Relationship:

Under the leadership of Mohammad Taraki, a group of mainly urban-based students and intellectuals founded Afghan communist party, called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). (Bezhan, 2013) This party, led by Mohammad Taraki, "gained several seats in the Wolesi Jirgah (Afghan parliament) during the 1965 elections," however, "almost from the moment of its founding the PDPA was plagued by factional disputes" (Gibbs, 1987, p. 369). By 1967, the PDPA got split into two factions; the Khalq ('People') faction led by Taraki, and the Parcham ('Flag') faction led by Babrak Karmal. This split was mainly due to the personal and ethnic differences, in addition to the doctrinal disputes (Leake, 2018). In terms of ideology, Parcham faction was considered to be more conservative in its approach, and its leader Babrak Karmal advocated moderate reforms towards socialism, keeping in view the predominantly tribal and peasant Afghan society, while leadership in the Khalq faction wanted more radical approach towards implementing socialist reforms. (Rais, 1994), (Gibbs, 1987)

Due to the growing threat of the leftists, especially in the background of the Soviet proximity, Afghan oligarchy, with the help of Islamists, convinced King Zahir Shah to ban publications like Parcham and Khalq. Furthermore, to counter the growing influence of communists, Islamists who not only enjoyed the favors of king and other traditionalist elements in the countryside, also made inroads in the cities, the traditional support base of the communists. For example, "in 1972, the Islamists won two-thirds of the elected seats in Kabul University student union". (Rais, 1994, p. 35) In short, by early 1970s Afghan politics was on the verge of extremism, in the form of communism on the left and Islamism on the right.

In July 1973, politics in Afghanistan took another turn when "modernist sections of the urban elite, the army, the civil bureaucracy and secular intellectuals," under the leadership of Sardar Mohammad Daud, former prime minister and cousin and brother-in-law of the king, staged coup and abolished monarchy. (Rais, 1994, p. 36) Daud declared himself as the president. Many members of the Parcham faction, which had supported the coup and had ties

to many of the military officers who had staged the coup, were able to secure important positions in the Daud government. However, these members remained committed to socialist revolution. Resultantly, “the communist movement thus constituted an unpredictable, and potentially destabilizing, force in Afghan politics”. (Gibbs, 1987, p. 370) When differences within the fragile coalition between Daoud and Parcham surfaced, Daoud took two important but cautious steps. First, he started diminishing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, by reducing number of Soviet advisors and sending Afghan military officers to India and Egypt for training. Moreover, he normalized relations with Pakistan and Iran (the countries that were under the US area of influence at the time). Soon afterwards, military and economic help from the US-backed shah of Iran started coming to Afghanistan. Second, he cracked down on the Parcham faction, by imprisoning most of their military backers, and on a politer note sending most of their influential leaders (including Babrak Karmal) on ‘diplomatic exile,’ by making them ambassadors (Gibbs, 1987; Rais, 1994).

In 1977, either under the Soviet influence or on their own (still a debatable issue), the Parcham and Khalq merged. Just within a year successful coup d’état was staged by PDPA sympathizers in military on April 27, 1978, who placed Taraki as head of the state. (Sultana & Azmatullah, 2015) From the very beginning, the Afghan government under PDPA proved to be disastrous, mainly because the PDPA take over was premature. In this regard, Gibbs (Gibbs, 1987, p. 372) mentions that at the time when PDPA came to power “the party lacked a popular base, an economic program, administrative experience, or even internal unity.” To make the matters worse, despite the warnings by the communist parties of the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European countries, the PDPA undertook radical reform policies, under the guidance of Hafizullah Amin who was associated with Khalq, resulting in further massive discontent. (Woods, 2011) Resistance started in rural areas and soon spread across the country as a rebellion. By the year 1979, “the insurrection included six Islamic guerrilla groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan. These groups received limited aid from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In addition, there were about 200 locally led rebellions throughout the country. The insurrection had broad popular support.” Moreover, as further time passed, “there were reports of massive troop mutinies, with revolts by entire garrisons in Herat in March 1979, in Jalalabad in April, and in Kabul itself in August”. (Gibbs, 1987, p. 372) Final blow to the self-rule of the PDPA came when Amin, from within the Khalq faction, staged an unexpected coup, killing Taraki and most of the other influential figures in the Afghan communist movement. By November 1979, strains between the Soviets and Amin reached the point of no return, amidst the reports that Amin hinted at seeking help from the Americans as well. Finally, “in December 1979 the Soviets *reluctantly* invaded Afghanistan and replaced Amin by Babrak Karmal as head of the state. Now, the Afghan government became little more than a puppet government” (Gibbs, 1987, p. 374).

Most of the authors on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan agree with Kennan’s view that Soviet policy was defense-oriented. Unlike the grand strategy school, which advocates that Soviet aim was to influence oil reserves in the Gulf and reach the Arabian sea in search of the warm ports, these authors provide three main reasons for the Soviets to invade Afghanistan. First, the Soviets were afraid of Islamists winning power on their border, who could spark rebellions among the Muslim-majority states of Soviet Union. Second, they did not want to lose their reputation internationally as they had publicly recognized PDPA government. Third, they wanted to get rid of radical elements in Afghan communist movement, especially Amin who had further lost his trust and commitment towards the communist cause in the eyes of Soviets when he killed Taraki and other influential communist leaders. (Gibbs, 1987), (Rais, 1994), (Amin Saikal, 1989)

Situation in Pakistan was not very hopeful as well. In a 1977 coup, General Zia had overthrown populist-leftist government of Z. A. Bhutto. As this overthrow was pushed by the religious groups in Pakistan, from the very beginning Zia sought his legitimacy in the Islamization of the country, which was counter to the Western interests in the region, especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979. (Bora, 2010) Moreover, Zia’s commitment towards nuclear program got him in trouble with the Carter administration, which suspended military and economic aid to Pakistan. Strains between US government and Zia government can be

symbolized by the fact that when Islamic revolutionary government in Iran pulled out of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization; a NATO style security arrangement with US) Pakistani government also followed the suite. Resultantly, Pakistan was admitted in the NAM (Non-aligned Movement), at the alliance's 1979 Cuba meeting. (Javed U. , 2018) At this time, US-Pakistan relations were extremely strained, but there was no total breakdown in the relations. Especially in the field of intelligence, Pakistan-US relations improved substantially. As Kux mentions, "after losing electronic listening posts in Iran because of the revolution, US officials approached Zia about collaboration in the collection of communications intelligences." When Zia agreed, "the Central Intelligence agency (CIA) provided technical assistance and equipment to improve Pakistan's electronic intercept capabilities". (Kux, 2001, p. 241) Moreover, Pakistan and US were also cooperating in aiding Afghan resistance (noticeably before the Soviet invasion) at a very modest level, but this cooperation would provide the framework for the large-scale cooperation between US and Pakistan during the Afghan war. Kux sums up this initial cooperation in the following words:

In July 1979, President Carter also approved a small covert-assistance program for Afghans opposing the communist government in Kabul. The CIA worked with its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), to channel aid to the fledgling Afghan resistance movement...The covert US help involved propaganda support and nonmilitary assistance but did not include arms or ammunitions. (Glogowski, 2011) According to Robert Gates, a later director of the CIA, the funding level was modest-less than \$1 million. Although small, the CIA-ISI effort was the seed from which the vastly larger and ultimately successful Afghan covert program grew. (Shapiro, 2020) Despite the strain in other facets of the relationship, growing cooperation between intelligence agencies signaled Zia's interest in maintaining Pakistan's links with United States and Washington's reciprocal willingness to work with Pakistan when it suited US interest, notwithstanding the two governments' substantial differences, especially over nuclear issues. (Kux, 2001, p. 242)

At home, initially (according to the constitution) Zia promised to hold elections within 90 days, but he kept on backtracking. Insurmountable economic difficulties and growing demands for elections had had Zia regime on defensive, who lacked international recognition as well. Things took a U-turn for Zia when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on the Christmas Eve. As Kux quotes Thornton, the US attitude towards Pakistan "[O]vernight, literally.... changed dramatically." When Carter called Zia, according to Kux, "his tone and message differed drastically from those of the conversation two had had a month before." In his conversation, Carter "reaffirmed the 1959 bilateral security agreement against communist aggression and offered to bolster Pakistan's security". (Kux, 2001, p. 245) Zia consulted his advisors, some of whom advised him not to provoke Soviets, when they were already at the Pakistani border, while others, referring to the Soviet grand strategy, warned that Pakistan's turn was next and it's better to confront Soviets in Afghanistan rather than in Pakistan. (Carson, 2018) Zia himself saw a great opportunity in this invasion to legitimize his rule before the Western countries, which were putting pressure on him to hold election. After the Soviet invasion, when Pakistan became the 'front-line' state, nobody from the Western countries asked for elections. On January 14, 1980, Carter administration offered \$400 million aid package (\$200 for security) over the period of two years. (Khan, 2012) Disappointed by the amount of aid, Zia rejected it as 'peanuts.' For the remainder of year, the Carter administration did not increase the amount of aid but offered more advanced military technology, especially the most sophisticated F-16s to lure Zia. Zia did not succumb to the pressure or persuasion and pinned his hopes to the newly elected Reagan administration.

When the Pakistani delegation, headed by General K. M. Arif and Foreign Minister Aga Shahi, prepared to go to Washington to discuss assistance, Zia instructed them "not to get into the details of the assistance until they had reached a satisfactory understanding on the issues of concern to Pakistan". (Kux, 2001, p. 257) These issues of concern included nuclear issue, military rule in Pakistan, ground rules of assistance, and security assurance for Pakistan. On the nuclear issue, both sides agreed the US will tolerate Pakistan's nuclear program, as far as

Pakistan does not explode the bomb. On the issue of democracy and human rights, Kux quotes, when “Arif told Haig, ‘We would not like to hear from you the type of government we should have.’ The secretary of state replied, “General, your internal situation is your problem.” (Kux, 2001, p. 257) US side also agreed on Pakistan’s insistence that CIA would provide covert aid for assistance to the ISI, and in turn the ISI would distribute it to the resistance. In other words, within the Pakistani territory, ISI would have all authority over the aid flow. In terms of Pakistani security, Pakistani side compromised by dropping its demand on a treaty ratified by the Congress, and became content with the assurances of the executive branch. Overall, Pakistani delegation was happy, when Reagan administration proposed \$3.2 billion aid package over five-year period, equally divided between economic and military assistance. (Group, 2012) By 1982, US was providing Pakistan \$600 million a year, which was reinforced by the ‘dollar-to-dollar’ matching of aid by Saudi Arabia. Moreover, modest amount of aid was also flowing from Japan and European countries, both for Pakistan itself and the Afghan refugees. Resultantly, Pakistani economy had substantial boost, which lasted the entire war period. Pakistani military on its part was also able to modernize itself. Kux also mentions “for Zia personally, the Afghan war meant a new lease on life politically, enormously strengthening his previously shaky position.” However, due to the influx of this aid, his regime became politically, financially and militarily dependent on the outside world, especially on the United States. (Kux, 2001, p. 266)

From the above discussion of the historical facts, we can conclude that at the beginning of the Afghan crisis, if the big powers were tied down, their smaller clients had all the incentives to get engaged in the war effort for their own survival.

Parties and Structure of the Geneva negotiations on the Afghan war:

Since US motive for Afghan resistance support was to inflict military and political cost on the USSR (the punishment strategy), not to change regime in Kabul, the US government was least interested in Afghan resistance politics. Policymakers in Washington argued that if Afghans are determined to fight Soviets, US should at least provide enough means to inflict significant blow to the Soviets. As Rubin argues, “The United States was satisfied as long as the mujahideen were ‘killing Russians.’” (Rubin, 1995, p. 35)

General Zia, on his part channeled aid to only those mujahideen groups which enhanced Pakistan’s security and his own rule. Six such groups were recognized, including some most radical Islamic groups. (Ahmed, 2012) Zia supported radical Islamic groups due to the following reasons. First, these radical Islamic groups did not have nationalist, but religious orientations, thus old age opposed Afghan claims on the Pakistani border areas, based on the ethnic and cultural affinity. Second, most of the groups recognized as legitimate for aid had already links with the ISI that were established before the war. Third, support of the Islamic groups coincided with Zia’s program of Islamization in Pakistan, which he had initiated to get legitimacy for his rule. Fourth, both his Islamization program in Pakistan and his support for radical Islamic groups won him the support of Saudis and other wealthy Arabs. As Zia was depending on Jamat-i-Islami to achieve his Islamization objectives at home, he made Jamat-i-Islami as partner in his dealings with the mujahideen groups as well. Actually, according to Rubin, both Saudis and Zia “subcontracted” the aid to mujahideen to the Jamat-i-Islami. (Wasi, 2021, p. 204-205) The whole structure to channelize international aid to the Afghan resistance involved coordination of at least four states (US, China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), wealthy private Arab donors, Pakistani religious groups and Afghan mujahideen (Afghan freedom fighters) commanders. At each step, Zia had made sure that Pakistan’s security interests and his own regime were not threatened in any way. (Rubin, 1995, p. 35)

In terms of Geneva negotiations, when Soviets vetoed resolution in the Security Council, office of the Secretary General used mandate from the General Assembly to initiate consultations on a political settlement. All concerned countries agreed that personal representative of Secretary General will mediate negotiations. Initially, Javier Perez de Cuellar was appointed to seek negotiations. When de Cuellar became the Secretary General in 1981, he appointed Diego Cordovez as his personal representative on Afghanistan issue.

The Afghan government sought direct talks with Pakistan and Iran, as almost all the refugees were in these two countries. These countries, from the Kabul’s point of view, were

harboring resistance and interfering in the Afghan internal affairs. As mujahideen themselves were not represented in the talks, Iran refused to participate in talks. Zia's government refused direct bilateral talks with Karmal regime on the pretext that this will mean implicit recognition to the Karmal regime. However, Pakistani side did not insist on the participation of mujahideen. At the time, "the resistance had no organization capable of engaging in such sort of negotiations, and Pakistan would not permit the formation of such an organization on its territory". (Rubin, 1995, p. 42) On all these issues, Reagan administration trusted Zia. The Soviets on their part convinced Karmal to accept proposed indirect talks in which "Cordovez would shuttle between the two delegations in Geneva, while keeping the Iranian government informed". (Rubin, 1995, p. 42) Focal point of the negotiations was that Soviets will withdraw their troops and Pakistani side will stop its aid to the mujahideen. It was also agreed that discussions will involve the issue of the return of mujahideen, and that agreement would also be guaranteed by appropriate international actors.

American and Pakistani policy toward the war was initially dominated by Bleeders, who wanted to keep Soviet forces pinned down for as long as possible. The UN negotiations gradually strengthened the Dealers. "A recurring theme in this account is the difficulty both superpowers had dealing with their clients". (Cordovez & Harrison, 1995, p. 21) As the possibility of a settlement grew more credible, Babrak Karmal increasingly resisted Soviet pressure to make concessions in Geneva. He feared that complete disengagement of the Soviet forces inherent in the UN agreement would undermine the survival of the communist regime. "Moscow was able to accelerate the pace of the negotiations once it replaced Karmal in May 1986 with Najibullah who was initially thought of being more flexible... In the end he proved equally difficult to manage". (Harrison, 1988, p. 33-34)

DISCUSSION

The central theme emerging from this study is that the Cold war world was dominated by the superpower rivalry but not by the superpowers. As Cordovez and Harrison mention, "Moscow and Washington saw themselves as the puppeteers pulling the strings. More often than not, however, they were manipulated by clients who had their agendas". (Cordovez & Harrison, 1995, p. 10)

The evidence in this study strongly suggests that state leaders are self-interested, rational individuals, whose primary interest is to stay in power. When leaders lack legitimacy for their rule at home, they look for the external sources of power for the perpetuation of their rule. (Baqai, 2021, p. 215-217) Both communist regime in Kabul and military regime in Islamabad, lacking in domestic support and legitimacy, invited or acceded to the external powers' involvement, thus establishing a client-patron relationship with those powers.

It was also found that with the passage of time this client-patron relationship deepens, which produces more dependent tendencies among the client regimes towards their respective patrons, as well as further alienation from the domestic constituents. One reason for this trend might be that when the strength of such regimes enhances, their rival forces (mainly domestic) also gather the strength to counter that power. This chain reaction at home leads to further dependence of such regime on the external forces.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the findings of this study confirm the main hypothesis that the authoritarian regimes will tend to keep that war alive for which cost is paid by the third parties. They use the benefits achieved by such war to perpetuate their own rule in two ways. First, they gain material strength and recognition of their rule from those external sources, which can help them to suppress the domestic dissent. Second, they can convince and get the support of general population for a war that brought mostly the benefits for their country, especially as we can in the case of Pakistan.

In this study, we have analyzed major assumptions and hypothesis of the previous studies in a qualitative way. Most of these findings confirm to the previous literature on the subject of war and regime survival. The main deficiency of these previous studies was found to be their emphasis on the industrialized democratic countries. In this study, we have tried to fill this gap by focusing on authoritarian Third World countries. Some amazing similarities were

traced between two types of the regimes. For example, general population in the Third World countries was found to be equally concerned about their rights as their counterparts in the industrialized democratic countries. Similarly, leaders of these country were found to be using diversionary force, as is the case with the leaders of the democratic countries, however, the dynamics of this force were entirely different than those of democratic regimes. I used only case study involving authoritarian regimes. Future studies can also expand to include Third World democratic regimes, especially in looking for the impact of the external sources of power on the dynamics of these regimes.

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