

WAR AND PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PAK-INDIA RELATIONS (2008-2018)

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ABSTRACT

This research aimed to investigate the War and Peace in South Asia: A Historical Analysis of Pak-India Relations (2008-2018). The aim was to analyze the relationships of both countries with regard to war and peace in connections with mutual disputes and negotiations efforts for peace process. Because of India and Pakistan's history of poor ties going back to 1947, discussions of collaboration have often occurred in the midst of threats of war and military confrontation. They have deployed their soldiers on several times as a consequence of a major threat of conflict. Diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan have been strained since the early 1990s as a result of turmoil in Kashmir and terrorist actions in other Indian states. After a series of high-profile terrorist strikes that took many lives, India's hostile spirit based on hatred against Pakistan has faded. Those opposed to the peace effort between India and Pakistan have established a pattern. Terrorist attacks have thwarted almost every Indo-Pakistani peace endeavor in recent years. As a consequence, belligerent minds dominate dialogues between India and Pakistan, constantly spreading negative narratives that condemn the adversary while creating virtue-based self-images in their own countries. Such negative narratives have been reinforced during a period of conflict, when there are numerous acts of violence, leading to an ongoing cycle of distrust, anxious to fight and violence that is difficult to escape. As a result, a positive cycle of trust and confidence growing between the two countries was never able to acquire traction or establish itself.

Keywords: Pak-India Relations, Kashmir Issue, Kargil Conflict, Water Dispute.

INTRODUCTION

In August, 1947 Pakistan and India came into existence as separate independent states in the subcontinent having their unique identities with regard to history and culture. Indian secularism has emerged constitutionally and normatively despite the fact that the country is ruled by a Hindu majority government. When faced with an adversary described to as "Hindu," Pakistan chose an overwhelming Islamic character for its nation-building and securitization efforts because of its ethnic diversity. Because of their divergent perspectives on statehood, India and Pakistan fought a war over Jammu and Kashmir relatively soon after gaining independence from the United Kingdom (Akhter, 2015). As well as how to split and share colonial institutions and financial resources, the two governments disagreed on how to allocate the allocation of civil and military bureaucracies and capital, among other things. Relations between India and Pakistan have deteriorated significantly since the 1984 Siachen War (Alam, 1998).

A visit by Rajiv Gandhi to Pakistan in 1989 did nothing to improve ties between the two countries, which continued throughout the 1990s. As a result of their concerns for their own safety and skepticism about each other's objectives, both countries engaged in a new battle in 1999 over the Kashmir border town of Kargil. During the much-anticipated Agra Summit in July 2001, the top leaders of the two countries finally had the chance to sit down and speak face to face for the first time. Although it had been a long time, the deep-seated concerns and questions remained with me. Current Indian-

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Pakistani relations are marked by territory disputes like the issue of Kashmir territory, issues relating to security, water crisis and other strategic problems with regard to geopolitical positions between Pakistan and India. It should come as no surprise that this battle is taking place at a time when human development in both nations is at its lowest point in history. Currently, 60 million Pakistanis and Indians live in abject poverty, accounting for 25–30 percent of the total population in both countries, according to the World Bank (Hussain, 2013). Both India-Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy and Rivers Divided are centered on the Kashmir issue and India-Pakistan nuclear ties, which are discussed in depth. Because of this, the function of permanent state institutions when it comes to assessing South Asian territorial disputes, nuclear arms race concerns, and regional strategic stability should be questioned.

A Historical Perspective of Pak-India Relations

Because of the division of the Indian subcontinent, the beginning of ties between Pakistan and India was fraught with animosity. In the short term, millions of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and other ethnic groups crossed the new boundaries to reside in either India or Pakistan, causing widespread consternation. During Pakistan's independence fight, there was a great deal of sectarian violence, which laid the basis for a long-term conflict with India (Thazha, 2005). In the opinion of Dixit, Pakistan and India have been at conflict since the two countries gained their independence (Dixit, 2002). Although there have been wars, border skirmishes, invasions, warlike situations, and confrontations, the two nations have worked together to find a peaceful solution to their differences in a number of ways. No matter how these programs have fared, it is conceivable to discuss why they have had little or no success (Jaffrelot, 2008).

Objectives of Research

After conducting a detailed review of the topic with regard to its relevant studies, the researcher aimed to achieve the following objectives;

1. To explore the causes of conflict between India and Pakistan.
2. To seek the relationships of both countries in connection with the disputes between Pakistan and India in the view of their foreign policies.
3. To analyze the relationships between both countries with regard to building peace process and negotiations in the South Asia.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The purpose of writing review is to nominate the factors related to society and media and to compare our study with other research studies. Various studies have been published on the issue of Indo-Pak relationships. In this study, most authentic and well-illustrated of them are used for better convenience of readers and to analyses the data related to study. Leading papers and authentic research studies are included in this research paper. Prior to independence, both Pakistan and India recognized the significance of Kashmir. Indians have begun the primary steps to annex Kashmir and deprive Pakistan of Kashmir. The reason of the 1965 conflict was Kashmir. At the time, the Indian government was pursuing moves to formally annex Kashmir to India, which Pakistan found intolerable. Pakistan accused India of violating human rights and inflicting misery on Kashmiri youth. By this time, tensions between Indian occupying forces and Kashmiri Muslims striving for independence had reached an all-time high (Kazimi, 2009).

According to Anu Satsangi and N.S Gehlot in 2004, Kashmir is the primary source of contention between Pakistan and India. This dispute is constantly disrupting the tranquilly in the area and contaminating the connection between these two nations. Until date, Pakistan and India have fought two major wars over the Kashmir dispute, and the Kashmir problem was largely responsible for triggering the 1971 war. Both India and Pakistan demonstrate their strength and status symbol as a result of their victory in the Kashmir acquisition. (Gehlot, 2004)

Ahmar argued that the Kashmir issue is constantly sabotaging Pakistan-India relations since it is the primary source of tension between the two nations. Since the intervention of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to resolve this problem and seek independence, the Indo-Pak relationship has seen steady modification (Ahmar, 2006).

According to Manoj Joshi in 2004, Kargil was the Indian Armed Forces' first media coverage conflict. This kind of media technology was employed to demonstrate their acknowledgement of their assistance. This resulted in higher military morale. Indian Forces even allowed media coverage of the conflict so that they could offer coverage of the fight. The Indian government appointed a media review committee, which thoroughly investigated these practices. The main goal of this was to boost national morale and ensure their support throughout the war (Joshi, 2004). Pakistan's media coverage Siraj's

analysis on the India war was published in the "New York Times" and the "Washington Post" in 2008. The cause for these war Journals, according to him, was media coverage. Many Indian journals supported by the US were prejudiced, portraying Pakistan as an adversary and India as a friend. The reports released in Indian media incited war, but many of the items described and reported in US journals urged peace negotiations (Sirag, 2008). Liberfeld argued that third-party nations in a conflict play an important role in assessing the war. In the event of a conflict, they may act as mediators to promote regional peace and national stability. External actors and guarantors might get engaged in such circumstances and serve as a third party. According to Sullaria, the Indian media is pushing the escalation of war in India, with TV programmes such as Door Darshan, pundits such as Akashwani, and Indian daily newspapers all interfering in inciting conflict. Rasul investigated the issue of Kashmir crisis in the editorial coverage of print media in Pakistan from 1998-1991. The results of the analysis indicated the shift in public views toward the tyrant conflicts in the Kashmir by the India. Following the publication of this report, these infractions were roundly denounced (Rasul, 2000).

President Pervez Musharraf suggested a satisfactory solution. On December 18, 2003, he claimed that under UN rules, Pakistan may proceed halfway toward plebiscite demand. Pervez Musharraf submitted a proposal on border acceptance of the Line of Control in his response. The United States characterized this speech as a positive step in terms of his readiness to disregard UN resolutions. Since then, the president has said that there should be reciprocal flexibility. Pakistan is unwilling to make a sacrifice on its own. Pakistan's sovereignty is jeopardized if it concedes on Kashmir, and if India compromises, it jeopardizes an outpost (Kazimi, 2009). According to Cheema tremendous obstacles to Kashmir's future would continue to be confronted. For starters, neither India nor Pakistan is ready to give up even an inch of their territory; they want the other country's land, in its whole or in part. Second, there are certain powerful third parties that are opposed to resolving this problem since it would expose their political agendas and undermine their political legitimacy. Since many powerful people in Pakistan and India have realized that this conflict has disrupted the subcontinent's peace and that this land warfare has gone on for far too long, it's time to resolve the issue and come to a general understanding by starting the peace talks and resolving the issue for the sake of general prosperity and peace (Cheema, 2001).

Pakistan-India Relations during Prime Minister Modi's Government were investigated by Aymen Ijaz (2017). The problem of water scarcity has also become a significant threat to Pakistan, since India has built a few hydroelectric projects on the Chenab and Jhelum streams, and it is still building the Kishenganga dam on the Neelum River in Kashmir, so violating the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960. The Pakistan-India Water Commission discussions stalled in 2015, and Pakistan is now looking for neutral assistance to resolve this problem. Following the Uri attack, Prime Minister Modi halted Indus Water Commission negotiations and aided in the extension of hydropower projects. Mirza (2015) stated in his article "Indus Water Disputes and India-Pakistan Relations" for the Department of Political Science South Asia Institute University of Heidelberg Federal Republic of Germany, that access to water resources played a significant role in the division of British Punjab—a imposed limit—which enabled India to capture Jammu and Kashmir from one perspective and use water as a key, monetary, and socio-mental weapon, in the 1948 Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir.

Zeb wrote an essay titled "Peace Process, Spoilers, and Indo-Pak Conflict" he suggested that the core reason of Pakistan's negative relationship with India is a lack of trust between the two nations. It is best shown by the Indian media and government's blaming stance, which blamed Pakistan for the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The traditional blaming process is undermining peace efforts in the India-Pakistan relationship. India intervened and sabotaged the peace talks by accusing Pakistan for the planned assaults. The Indian media and government authorities have consistently blamed Pakistan for the Mumbai attacks (Zeb, 2009). In a 2009 research, Akhter noted that leadership on both sides of the border has become more important as a vital stage in the peace process has been reached. According to a study, both nations have played a constructive and helpful role in conflict resolution in order to achieve peace in the area. Even after all of these attempts, conflict resolution remained elusive. Both nations' leaders have shown a dedication and sheer political will to solve the obstacles, roadblocks, and deadlocks that have jeopardized the peace process. The Mumbai attacks and the Samjhota Express explosions disrupted the conflict resolution process. Both India's and Pakistan's leaders acknowledged that a breakthrough on the Siachen issue may have resulted in the permanent consolidation of the peace process. Terrorism and Kashmir have always gotten in the way of resolving disputes between India and Pakistan. Certain concessions were made in the case of terrorism and the Kashmir issue, such as perceptual convergence and decreasing of mistrust, but democracy could not bring about peace in the subcontinent.

Concerning the current peace talks between Pakistan and India, Cheema said in 2004 that both nations' willingness to live in peace had been conveyed unequivocally. Over the last 55 years, political baggage and historical backdrops have hampered regional security and peace talks. The absence of regional security and peace discussions has exacted a tremendous toll on human growth. According to him, both countries are always looking for loopholes to exploit, whether it is at the expense of terrorism, Kashmir, or even sports and cultural gaps. Since both nations have squandered so many projects and chances in recent years, serious efforts should be made to make this one a success. Both parties must take bold steps and use realistic measures to advance the current peace talks (Cheema, 2004).

Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

Since 2003, Indo-Pak relations have steadily improved, with peace talks receiving increased attention and priority as a result of several pressing issues confronting India, including the country's inability to meet its goals following a bloody year-long standoff, the strong desire of Indian businesses to gain access to the Pakistani market, and India's energy shortage, which has slowed the country's economic growth. While Pakistan advocated for a "peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem," the US advocated for a process of reconciliation between nuclear-armed nations India and Pakistan owing to their significant role in Afghanistan's War on Terror. This was diametrically opposed to Pakistan's stance. According to Richard Lugar, "conflict was avoided (between India and Pakistan) by a hair's breadth" as a result of "vigorous, determined diplomacy by the United States" (Navlakha, 2009).

However, in 2004, the Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President met in New York for a successful peace conference, which boosted Pakistan's confidence even more. Following that, in December 2004, the Foreign Secretaries of both countries met, which had a more beneficial impact on both governments' peace agendas. The peace process was often jeopardized due to Pakistan's alleged involvement in terrorist activities. During his UN speech, India's Prime Minister may have mentioned "cross-border terrorism." When asked about India's reaction, President Musharraf reminded the audience at the United Nations General Assembly in New York City that UN decisions on Kashmir had yet to be implemented. Despite the many imperfections, it was evident that both sides were committed to bringing the peace process ahead. President Musharraf's objective was a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir problem, and he wanted it to be based on the best possible logic. According to India's concerns, terrorist infrastructure must be entirely eliminated in order for the peace process between India and Pakistan to succeed. Regarding the Kashmir issue, which remains a major stumbling block in the peace process, Pakistan continues to strive for a resolution (Khalid, 2012).

Following the Mumbai assault in 2008, it was another violent occurrence that had a long lasting influence on Pakistani-Indian ties. The November 26, 2008, assault was carried out by around ten attackers. According to the allegations, they arrived in Mumbai by fishing boat. India suspended Composite Dialogue with Pakistan. It also took additional strong steps against Pakistan, but avoided a direct confrontation with the country. Despite the passage of time, bilateral ties have not recovered from the terrorist attack in Mumbai (Samarjit, 2009).

Joint Efforts for Peace Building

In the history of Pakistan-India relations, recurring tensions and confrontations have been contrasted with more recent attempts at negotiation toward peace. The fact that the two nations got together and attempted to address their differences amicably, whether via their own efforts or those of other parties, was a show of maturity. The following three categories of persons are active in the peace initiatives:

- United Nations Role
- Bilateral Tracks
- Third Party Interventions

During the first conflict, the United Nations was asked to intervene in Kashmir. The war began in 1948 and concluded on January 1, 1949, when the United Nations assisted in negotiating a cease-fire. A referendum in Kashmir was to be conducted to determine the region's status, according to a UNSC resolution issued on January 9, 1949. Despite the fact that both India and Pakistan agreed to the agreement, which gave a clear framework for addressing the issue, it has yet to be addressed. The United Nations brought the second Kashmir war, known as the 1965 struggle, to a conclusion. The United Nations Security Council issued a resolution asking for a cessation of hostilities on September 22, 1965. The Tashkent Agreement, signed in January 1966, sought to end the hostilities. The former Soviet Union provided financial assistance for the event. As a consequence of its efforts in 1949 and 1965 the United Nations failed to approve a resolution in 1971 that would have resulted in the separation of

Pakistan. The international community seems to have done nothing to prevent India from invading what was then East Pakistan.

Despite its failure, the United Nations remains the most effective arena for increasing awareness of tensions between Pakistan and India and providing support for the execution of its August Kashmir resolution. Pakistan and India have sought to solve their issues via bilateral initiatives. Furthermore, bilateral efforts to solve the Siachen plateau issue were done in a concerted manner. According to Abdul Sattar, Pakistan's former Foreign Secretary and Indian Foreign Secretary met in July 1989. After their discussion, Indian and Pakistani Prime Minister reached a draught agreement. Regardless, it was never implemented (Sattar, 2007). In terms of substance, it is a wonderful example of bilateral efforts when the two countries agreed in December 1985 not to target one other's nuclear installations. The list of civil nuclear sites may be shared each year as part of this agreement. When the Consular Access Agreement was signed in 2008, it allowed for the exchange of prisoner lists twice a year, as well as a system to enable convicts who are detained to have consular access. These pacts have stood the test of time and are still in effect today (India Today, 2008). The 1990s were a fruitful decade for bilateral ties, as the two nation's reintroduced genuine diplomacy. The trend has maintained since a 1991 accord mandating early notice of military manoeuvres and exercises. Over flight airspace is expressly excluded from the agreement's requirements. In 1992, the two parties also agreed on a joint proclamation prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. (Hashim, 2014)

Track II diplomacy gained prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This diplomatic mechanism came about via a variety of channels. In this sense, the Neemrana Process, which began in 1991 and is still ongoing, stands out. However, tensions rose in 1998 as a result of nuclear tests conducted by both sides, and the Kargil War in 1999 erased all of the decades of excellent work that had been done. While the Mumbai attack stopped the whole process, it also put a long shadow over any future peace efforts. Reengagement was tried, but it was time-consuming and ultimately ineffective. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and his colleague Man Mohan Singh initially displayed indications of rapprochement in Sharm al-Sheikh. Baluchistan was addressed in a unified statement for the first time, which was a big step forward. Despite renewed optimism about peace talks, Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh was chastised for caving down to Pakistan's demand for Baluchistan inclusion. As a result, he needed to take some time off. Despite anticipation that the conversations would be renewed when Singh and Gilani met in Bhutan in April 2010 on the margins of the SAARC Summit, no progress was achieved.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif travelled to New Delhi in 2014 to observe Prime Minister Narendra Modi's swearing-in ceremony. However, general elections in Kashmir were on the horizon, and the Modi administration hoped to capitalize on the Pakistan factor. This strategy, however, did not acquire traction. There was fresh optimism for peace negotiations between Pakistan and India as a result of Sushma Swaraj's December 2015 travel to Islamabad to attend the Istanbul Process summit. On December 25, 2015 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi rushed to Lahore, reviving the peace process.

Third-party mediation has shown to be highly useful in settling conflicts between Pakistan and India. The signing of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960 marked the beginning of such an attempt. The World Bank played an important role in bringing the deliberations to a conclusion and reaching an agreement. According to historians, the fact that it has withstood decades of tension and warfare between Pakistan and India qualifies it as a historic water deal. While accusing each other of breaching the agreement, both parties maintain that they did so. The Indus Water Commissioner of Pakistan visited India earlier this month to assess water projects in the Chenab basin (Geeta, 2019). The accord reached to resolve the Rann of Kutch conflict via negotiations is a successful example of third-party mediation. Among other instances, the Tashkent Agreement, signed in January of that year, is one. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the 1965 conflict between Pakistan and India was effectively ended. During the fighting, the two antagonists agreed to restore peace by returning to pre-war positions and surrendering the land they had gained. As a result, studies show that third-party mediation is more effective than bilateral dialogues in resolving disputes between Pakistan and India. Several bilateral efforts have failed, and the UN has also failed to provide satisfactory results, notably the inability to implement its judgments on Kashmir.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Since 1947, ties between Pakistan and India have had several ups and downs. Despite the fact that there have been wars and disputes, the two nations have shown a consistent willingness to return to the negotiating table after every setback. The desire for peaceful cohabitation has, regrettably, not been translated into long-term peace and collaboration between the two sides of the conflict. As a result, the central argument of the study was based on the idea that third-party mediation is the most effective method of dispute settlement between India and Pakistan. The discussion above demonstrates that third-party mediation has shown to be the most effective method of bringing about peace between the two nations. Third-party interventions have shown to be more successful for peace throughout history, from the historic IWT to the Rann of Kuch and the handling of hostilities like as the Kargil War and the military standoff of 2002 to the present.

When compared to typical third-party mediation, the function of the United Nations is unique. In 1949 and 1965, the United Nations was essential in bringing the first Kashmir conflict to a close, but it has been unable to bring about peace in the region since then. As a result, it has played a limited part in the settlement of the most significant dispute between Pakistan and India up to this point. While India's unwillingness to allow the United Nations to have a final voice in Kashmir is the primary reason, the international organization cannot be excused of its failure since it seldom adopted a moral and legal perspective on the issue in order to play a pro-active role in Kashmir. However, the UN Security Council decisions are still relevant and have the potential to make significant contributions to the settlement of the Kashmir conflict.

There are numerous excellent instances of successful bilateral peace efforts, but they have always fallen short of resolving the underlying problems at stake. The Composite Dialogue process was the most extensive peace endeavor ever undertaken to date, but it was ultimately unsuccessful, with none of the key topics covered being resolved as a result. It demonstrates that the bilateral channel may be useful in laying the groundwork or resolving small difficulties, but that it has proven ineffectual in dealing with larger concerns in the past.

The lack of an institutional framework to handle tensions and disputes is the most significant factor for the failure of bilateral attempts to resolve them. The second factor is a strong sense of distrust that exists between the two nations. The failure of the United Nations and bilateral channels creates room for the execution of other choices. Because third-party mediation has a proven track record of effectiveness, it should be utilized to resolve critical issues relating to Pakistan-India ties, according to Strategic Studies.

So, the world community must recognize its duty as a mediator and turn its attention back to South Asia, which has the potential to become a nuclear flashpoint. India should also reconsider its approach and acknowledge the value of third-party mediations in international disputes. Allowing the United Nations to utilize its good offices to assist in the resolution of the Kashmir conflict, which is critical for regional peace and good relations between Pakistan and India, should also be allowed.

Following a close examination of the events that occurred during the Musharraf administration, one can safely conclude that India's bilateral engagement with Pakistan was centered on the Kashmir Problem and the resulting Cross-Border Terrorism (as India accuses Pakistan of being behind any untoward incident that occurred in the Indian-held Valley), and that in reality, they posed a serious challenge, particularly as it always remained a test of mettle and acumen for the leadership of both countries. It also emphasized the need of having a strong political will to continue and maintain discourse and discussion even when things become heated. The compulsion of the historical process provided a golden opportunity for both Musharraf and Vajpayee to infuse new energy into breaking the tyranny of the decades-old status quo, thereby putting aside their differences and ignoring the dark side of geostrategic and geopolitical upheavals, as well as the consequences of their decisions. Beyond the differences and follies on both sides, the world has experienced a "new" wave of bilateralism between the ever-belligerent countries, and if this wave continues, its beneficial influence on the path of history may be sufficient to alter the course of history completely.

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have been unable to reach an agreement on a single assenting point in order to address their inherited territorial issues. The historical trial demonstrates their inconsistent ties and unresolved concerns, which prevented the two countries from achieving a state of harmony. The twenty-first century saw the emergence of a new phase of terrorism, which has thrown the Indo-Pak relationship into a state of perpetual uncertainty. The succession of terrorist attacks on India, as well as the attacks on Muslims by Indian zealots have had a long-lasting influence on the continuing peace process. The 2008 attack on the elite Indian citizens and foreigners in Mumbai

demonstrated the severe terrorist capacity that threatened the security of one of India's busiest cities for many days, demonstrating the extreme militant capability. It also raised numerous concerns about the Indian security and intelligence apparatus, which was unable to detect and defend the city and the elite establishment from the onslaught of violence that took place.

After the Mumbai attacks, it became clear that the Indo-Pak peace talks had been stabbed in the back. The episode served as the last nail in the coffin and a focal point of mistrust between the two countries. It aided and abetted the subcontinent's participation in the wave of terrorism while defaming Pakistan as the worldwide breeding ground for terrorism. In light of the fact that the attacks on Mumbai were directed against foreigners and Indians declared the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack as the "9/11 of India" and advocated unjustifiable pressure on Pakistan to end terrorism, while ignoring their own fascist groups' terrorism against Muslims in India and beyond.

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