

THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (1992-1995) AND ITS CAUSES

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ABSTRACT

The brutal conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina were the reminder of chaos and upheaval which dominated post Cold War World. The fall of Soviet Union and resulting shifts in international security did not create the 'New World Order' that was envisaged by many, rather it was a rampant security disorder that stayed for long. At the core of this has been massive increase in communal, religious and ethnic violence. Governments and people released from former Soviet rule swept by new democratic wave began to take up slogans of nationalism. In some instances, this was peaceful arising such as split of Czechoslovakia. In other cases like Yugoslavia, Georgia and Azerbaijan nationalist sentiment exploded violently. Europe and its surroundings had not seen bloodshed of this scale since World War II. The break up of huge empires invariably resulted in periods of general political instability and intense nationalism. In remote troubled areas like Angola and Somalia where nationalism had lesser role, experts predicted outbreak of conflict. As the cold War was over these regions lost immediate strategic importance, as a result inter ethnic conflicts emerged in tribal regions. These conflicts were protracted and international community remained reluctant to intervene. An example of such conflict is Bosnia, where wide array of local and international factors resulted in conflicts. This article attempts to thoroughly examine the factors responsible for the conflict. Moreover, it also sheds light on the role played by international actors that either amplified or resolved the conflict. For this purpose, the study adopted a qualitative approach (i.e. using the existing body of literature-books, newspapers, and journal articles to draw conclusion).

Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, conflict, war, religion, political, ethnicities

INTRODUCTION

Arguments that violent ethnic conflict is the outcome of a complex interaction of incitement and occasional instances is fruitless (Collier & Sambanis, 2005). There are too many factors that can lead to interethnic violence. When analyzing the scientific debate about the possibility of the onset of civil wars, inter-ethnic and non-inter-ethnic civil wars should be seen in 2 categories (Sambanis, 2001). While ethnic diversity may not be the cause of non-ethnic conflict, it is the root cause of inter-ethnic hostilities. The conflict in "Bosnia and Herzegovina" in addition to being inter-ethnic, was multifaceted and complicated by political, religious, and other aspects like problems of property rights and territorial administration. Ethnic tensions were present prior to the start of hostilities, but they intensified as Serb-Montenegrin aggression led to the war's expansion throughout B-H. The former Yugoslavia and the Croatia's role in this war should be taken into consideration when looking at conventional analysis that highlights the impact of geography on the origin and progression of inter-ethnic armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the fact that neither nation had clearly stated political or strategic aims or a military goal, they both took their time making important choices. Each nation sought the easiest route and tried to avoid confrontation (Centro et al., 2016).

However, it wasn't a dominant component in the Balkans, some scholars highlight topographical elements that suggest crucial aspects in predicting the commencement of an armed conflict. On the difficult path from authoritarianism to democratization, institutional and political transformation are what are primarily at play. This shift caused internal unrest, which was readily followed by civil conflict. Groups opposed to new sociopolitical systems attempted to take advantage

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of their privileged position, particularly if they feared losing their leading position and social standing. Some contend that the use of major conventional military operations for the control of military facilities in Central Bosnia between 1993 and 1994 should be viewed as evidence that the war in B-H should be considered a conventional civil war (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). However, instances of regular fighting between the combatants did not accurately capture the spirit or nature of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The players' character, form, and nature changed over time. Local coalitions that were frequently linked to the illegal market influenced the war's dynamics. Ethnic cleansing, atrocities, senseless devastation, international forces operating without a clear mission, intervention of foreign nations, and a discernible presence of Islamist extremists who arrived in B-H with the intention of leading "Jihad" were other aspects of the conflict (Centro et al., 2016).

Due to the development of these Islamist organizations and their orthodox ideologies, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war was chaotic and confusing. Residents of Albania, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Qatar, Yemen, Kuwait, Palestine, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey joined the Bosniacs. These jihadists saw it as their responsibility to wage a holy war against Allah's enemies, the unbelievers, in accordance with the will of Allah. Especially in Zenica, Sarajevo, Mostar, and areas of Central Bosnia, these organizations were mainly believers of the Salafi learning. Salafi is a worldwide jihad movement that combines violent terrorist acts with a conservative and puritanical understanding of Islam. The movement's fundamental objective is to establish former Muslim greatness in a large Islamist state (Shultz & Dew, 2009). Their presence changed the nature of the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They initially battled the Orthodox Serbs, but later, they engaged in even more fierce combat with the Catholic Croats. It is impossible to find accurate information on how many of these foreign combatants fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the number is probably between two to four thousand. Already in 1993, the unit "Al Mujahedeen" was founded and formally merged in the 3rd Corps of the Military of B-H, granting the Muslim foreign combatants the legal status. It is reported approximately 200 Islamist fighters, or mujahedeen, died during the conflict in B-H. However, after the "Dayton Peace Agreement" in 1995 the majority was ousted owing of tremendous pressure from the America despite the fact that some of the combatants were married to local Muslim girls and continued to live in B-H (Centro et al., 2016).

The Republic of Croatia had an important role in mediating the entry of these soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but analysts often downplay this fact. Nonetheless, their entry in B-H did not ease tensions; on the contrary, their presence increased the ferocity of the interethnic fighting. Thus, this transnational religious war or jihad in B-H was also an internationalized civil war and so an intellectual conflict.

Was a bloody conflict unavoidable?

In a multicultural state like Yugoslavia, nationality will be a prominent source of political conflict and nationalist leaders and intellectuals will exist. Yugoslavia's political structures and constitution were carefully created and balanced to address nationality. Inevitably, a nationalist challenge would focus on stateness, rights of minorities, and power-sharing: if established political unit boundaries are renegotiated or altered, who determines which populations and regions belong to the new and the old political entities? Will the majority ethnonational affiliation serve as the prerequisite for full citizenship, or will all peoples in the new entities be treated equally as citizens for governance? The two main nationalities in Yugoslavia, the Serbs and the Croats, came into conflict after nationalism there was let loose. With 25% of Serbs living outside of Serbia, the security of the Serbs was guaranteed by a centralized Yugoslav state. A fragmented state and a feeble federation meant that Croats could govern their own futures without being constrained by ineffective official institutions and businesses run and maintained by Serbs, given their longstanding hostility to Hapsburg administration. However, nationality disputes may have been settled via democratic institutions in a confederation, collective privileges for minorities, systems of political participation in elections, and collective decision-making procedures in assemblies that would safeguard the voices of minorities and favor coalitions over majority rule (Sisk 1996). These changes would have made it difficult for nationalist leaders to enlist the support of the populace. In a country where there are significant disparities in economic progress and standard of living amongst the Republics misunderstandings will arise regarding economic policies, taxation, transfers, subsidies across regions, and abandoning socialism for a market economy. Since World War II, all Republics had witnessed significant economic growth. Yugoslavia's economy could still be fixed. The communist officials in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s shared this desire to hold onto power with those in other communist countries. Some reprogrammed as reformcommunists with the intention of advancing toward social democracy in the

vein of Europe. Others decided to use ethnonationalism as their platform for power and to establish a new standard of legitimacy for the post-communist government. While extremist nationalists were prepared to use force and violence to achieve their objectives, moderate nationalists promoted international harmony (Oberschall, 2000). The defeat of the moderates was not inevitable.

Character of the War

War is a human communicative act. Hence, we assert that the war belongs in the realm of social life rather than the arts and sciences. This huge conflict of interest is resolved via blood, and only because it is unique from the others. In a political climate the war arose when leaders inspired and involved their intended populace.

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 is the perfect example for military leaders of today. They need to grow their perspectives and accept new challenges. They need to transform from a conceptually bi-dimensional perception of space and time to a multidimensional comprehension of the conflict. The opponents today operate in a complicated, interconnected operating environment and have access to a wide range of options. The adversaries today deploy deception, employ every tool at their disposal, and always seem to be one step ahead.

For instance, war was unavoidably necessary for the government change in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a developed democracy, a successful democratic transition takes place as a planned group project with the proper checks and balances. But if it takes place in a climate of intimidation and extortion, it's extremely possible that tensions will rise and an armed confrontation would follow. The Bosnia and Herzegovina independence referendum took place in these circumstances. In spite of the internationally recognized procedure, Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions were paralyzed, which led to war rather than the establishment of a democratic parliamentary system. This was unquestionably suggested during a discussion on autonomy at a sitting of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 14, 1991, when the Serbian representatives left in protest. Simply stated, none of the relevant political actors were yet prepared to engage in political dialogue and instead turned to serving the perceived needs of their respective populations. Political marginalization and a disdain for the political rights of some national groups result in civil unrest (Wimmer et al., 2009).

During the conflict, negotiations for B-H's political and administrative rebuilding took place in a shadowy and enigmatic manner. This procedure often excluded those not directly involved in the dispute. Although the conflict in B-H may have been classified as a conventional conflict at some points, it was really more of an irregular conflict. Although it is impossible to pinpoint the exact line dividing irregular warfare from conventional (regular) warfare, it is possible to define irregular warfare as hostilities fought by units other than a belligerent force's regular army. It is best to think of the regular and irregular sides of the conflict as two facets of the same action. Two different types of irregular warfare made up this war's irregular nature. These included an uprising and a military takeover. The President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, was taken hostage, and the Yugoslav National Army cut off phone service in Sarajevo on May 1-2, 1992, as part of the conventional military coup. The newly installed administration of an autonomous B-H was overthrown by the ethnic Serbs (Centro et al., 2016).

The Categorization of War

A civil war is characterized as "a war that includes at least one non-state group that participates in an armed conflict against the state resulting in at least 1,000 killed" (Sarkees & Schafer, 2000). in the "Correlates of War" (COW) database. A civil war differs from other irregular kinds of conflict in that it frequently blurs the line between the irregular and conventional conflict. The fight involves two or more factions and takes place within a recognized national area, which makes it unusual/unconventional (Centro et al., 2016).

Sambanis was able to reach additional results by using a broad definition of civil war. He used the following six conditions to define a civil war:

1. More than 1,000 people have lost their lives in the conflict;
2. The sovereignty of internationally recognized states has been called into question;
3. It occurs within the established borders of that country;
4. It includes the government as one of the principal combatants;
5. It has the insurgents with the capacity to lead an organized opposition; and
6. It contains parties who were not content with the proposal of living together in the same political unit following the war (Sambanis, 2000).

A war within a state (intra-state wars) is considered "internationalized" by the COW definition when one or more nations enter the fray. It should be emphasized that the classic typology

of wars, which focused on international and civil warfare, has changed, leading to the current typology of wars.

Some of the wars were moved from one category to another as a result of the periodic systematization of all wars to new standards. Criteria are defined in the "COW database" and can also be updated. A list of transformed wars was also provided by the database. Between 7 April 1992 and 13 May 1992, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina changed from being "Wars between states" and "The War of Independence" to being "The wars in the state" and "the revolt of Bosnian Serbs" (14 May 1992 – 31 December 1994). This classification becomes even more complex when the criterion of active participants in the conflict, as well as local coalitions formed and neighboring states, are taken into account (Centro et al., 2016).

The main classification of conflicts will undoubtedly continue to evolve, but it's critical to underline the war in B-H's initially aggressive nature. The Serb-Montenegrin invasion of B-H should be highlighted while deciding on the vocabulary and standards for classifying this kind of conflict. Following the Yugoslav People's Army's withdrawal of forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the conflict turned into a civil war. Some of these soldiers remained and joined the "Serbian Democratic Party" (SDS) paramilitary force in B-H (Centro et al., 2016).

Causes of War

Domestic Factors

Undoubtedly, religion played a crucial role in the hostilities in Bosnia. But despite the fact that the 3 parties involved in conflict are commonly grouped into 3 religious groupings (Catholic Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Orthodox Christian Serbs,) it would be incorrect to define this as a purely religious conflict. Although religious communities had lived side by side and intermarried for many years, a unified shared identity did not emerge. Nationalists exploited ethno-religious identity as a mobilizing point to bring their populations together rather than battling over religion. Religious shrines or cultural icons were significant symbolic rallying places as a result of the historical stories and cultural symbols connected to religion that tremendously aided in unifying each group. For instance, the burning of the Old Bridge in Mostar, which connected the Muslim and Catholic parts of the city, was both a strategic military strike and a significant symbolic blow against unification. Occasionally, clerics were assassinated because of their symbolic significance rather than because they had any active involvement in controlling the conflict. Undoubtedly, the heritage of various suffering myths was exploited to influence these people to go to war. Understanding the region's multiplicity of ethnicities and religions is extremely difficult. The main ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia were Croats (most of whom were Catholic), Serbs (most of whom were Orthodox Christians), Macedonians (most of whom were Orthodox), Slovenians (most of whom were Catholic), Montenegrins (most of whom were Orthodox), and Bosniaks and Serbs (a mixture of Muslims/Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats). Albanians, who today rule Kosovo and are primarily Muslim, were one national minority, followed by smaller communities of Slovaks, Hungarians, Italians, Ruthenians, and Turks. Bosniaks, frequently those with remote Serb or Croat origin, did not convert to Christianity after the Ottoman Turks were forced out of the area. They also typically did not identify as Serb or Croat. Tito decided to give them the label of their own ethnic nationality—Muslim—in order to settle the problem. Because they are Muslims both by faith and by nationality, this group is a unique occurrence in Islam. Since then, particularly as a result of the 1990s hostilities, this ethnic minority has chosen to use the name Bosniak, much to the dismay of Serb and Croat Bosnians who also occasionally refer to themselves in that way. The issue was made more complicated by the fact that Bosnia's Muslim population, regardless of its Albanian ancestry, did not frequently receive the ethnic title "Albanian" (Burg & Shoup, 1999). Yugoslavs were questioned whether they considered themselves to be religious in a 1988 national group survey, 56 % of Croats agreed, compared to 37 % Bosniaks and 19 % Serbs. Only a fifth of Serbs professed to be religious, despite the fact that Serbian nationalists, notably religious leaders, utilized religious language and ideas to support their brutality throughout the 1990s. On the other hand, when asked which nationality they belong to 82 % of Muslims said they are Albanians, 77 percent of Orthodox Christians said they are Serbs, and 89 % of Catholics said they are Croats. 54 % of Muslims, 51 % of Serbs, and 50 % of Croats agreed that being Serb and Orthodox, Croat and Catholic, and being Albanian and Muslim, respectively, mean the same thing when asked to identify the "other" as having a similar religious and national identity. Last but not least, 66 % of Serbs, 64 % of Croats, and 60 % of Muslims agreed when questioned if these religious characteristics appropriately reflected their nationalities. This implies two ideas. First, there were clear majorities who self-identified as having a combined religion and

nationality. Second, there were sizeable minorities who separated ethnicity and religion, and under the right circumstances, they could have been able to seek peaceful coexistence (Burg & Shoup, 1999).

Religion and Socioeconomic Factors

The war in Bosnia was influenced by a number of internal variables, including trends in economic development and demographics. Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks were the three ethno-religious groupings that ruled the former Yugoslavia. Orthodox Serbs made up 40% of Yugoslavia's 22 million people, followed by Croats (20%) and Muslims (9%), who made up the remaining population. A little demographic shift occurred in the 2 decades preceding 1991, with Serb numbers falling and Muslims marginally increasing. But the population picture in successor territories was very different from the overall picture at the time of Yugoslavia's dissolution. For instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina was quite diversified (Muslims 45%, Serbs 33%, Croats 18%, others 4%) while Croatia still had a sizable (20%) Serb minority. The conflict widened and worsened as a result of the ethnic diversity and the religious and political claims made by parties on both sides. In present-day Bosnia, the percentage of Muslims has increased to 50% of the total population, while the percentage of Croats has decreased to 14%. According to data from the 1991 census, economic pressure was a factor in the deterioration of racial relations in the years before the conflict. Bosnia, which was among the poorest of the Yugoslav republics, was particularly impacted by this (Paul, 1995). For instance, Slovenia's GDP was three folds that of Bosnia, and Croatia's GDP was practically double that of Bosnia in 1989. Muslims and Serbs were deadly competitors in Bosnia over the fight for resources. Between 1971 and 1991, this rivalry was intensified by Bosnia's gradually declining Serbian population and steadily increasing Muslim population. Nationalist politics grew in popularity as a result of the economic downturn that followed Tito's death and the conclusion of the Cold War a decade later. The Communist Party's leadership and economic policies were disgraced by scandals, corruption, and nepotism. Communist leaders, most notably Milosevic, embraced nationalist policies out of fear for the outcome of a national election in order to maintain their hold on power. Economic inequalities kept Yugoslavia divided. Old allegations and prejudices about Muslims being lazy and Serbs being greedy were pervasive. As a result, each party utilized nationalism as a rallying cry to assert claim to any assets that were available and attacked its competitors for internal issues. The unresolved issue of conflicting nationalisms, which adopted religious undertones and rhetoric, was just as significant to the disintegration of Yugoslavia as the economic crisis. Political elites employed ethnonationalist and religious discourse to strengthen their group and denigrate their rivals in order to keep power after realizing that communist appeals to the public no longer had the same effect (Paul, 1995).

Between 1950 through the middle of the 1970s, following World War II, Yugoslavia's economy grew dramatically. However, there was a concealed threat; the uneven pace of regional economic progress. Slovenia, particularly, and Croatia relative to each other developed more quickly. In the entire former Yugoslavia, their population made up 27.6% of the total and they occupied 30% of the land, while their social output value made up 42.1% and their exports made up 46.3%. Consequently, there was a significant financial disparity between the two nations and the less developed areas of Yugoslavia (such as the autonomous province of Kosovo of Serbia Republic, the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro Republic, and B-H Republic) (Zhang, 2008). For instance, if the Yugoslavia per capita social value index is 100 in 1989, Slovenia will rank 203, Croatia will rank 128 and Kosovo will rank 23rd. Slovenia and Kosovo will have an 8.8 to 1 gap ratio. Slovenia's per capita GNP in 1991 was 12520 US dollars, Croatia's was 7110, Serbia's was 4950, and Macedonia's was 3330, while less than 3000 US dollars were spent in Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other underdeveloped regions. Croatia and Slovenia believed that other republics were impeding their economic growth because the former Yugoslavia required all the republics and the independent provinces to contribute funds for the underdeveloped regions (a certain fraction deduction was taken from every worker's monthly income). So, remaining in the Yugoslav Federation was not economically beneficial. Thus, they were the first to secede. Additionally, Yugoslavia's economy has been in long-term decline since the middle of the 1970s. The GDP in 1990 was equal to that in 1979. The magnitude of the inflation increased. The rate of unemployment was skyrocketing. All of these factors heightened the political unrest (Zhang, 2008).

Thus, the conflicts between religious groups became more acute due to the economic crisis. Few could have predicted at the time that long-masked by Tito's Yugoslav nationalism, religious and ethnic tensions could once again play such potent and fatal roles. Despite a 1995 international intervention, ethnic genocide resurfaced in Kosovo in 1999, leading to a second Western-led

operation. The region still has a shaky peace today, with Croatia and Serbia having institutions that are growing stronger, while Bosnia's administration is still having difficulties despite receiving significant international support. Religious leaders and places of worship continue to be important hubs for ethnic group mobilization, and the wider region, including Macedonia and Albania, is still volatile and precarious. Only time will tell if lingering hostilities can be put to rest and a lasting peace can emerge (Velikonja, 2003).

Psychological Factors

Unlike Bosnians, Serbs had influential leadership. Comparison of the economic conditions show that Serbs were dominant and had well prepared and established military forces. It is not completely appropriate to describe, evaluate and explain reasons of Bosnia conflict on the basis of economic conditions. Serbs even sacrificed their lives for ethnically cleansing Bosnian population. Economic influence is an important factor, but whole case of the Bosnian conflict cannot be analyzed under this. Ethnic conflict was based more upon less tangible rather than materialistic and tangible approach (BAYRAKTAR). Horowitz and Kaufman argued about relevancy of the psychological aspects of the conflict. It was argued that prejudice had vital part in the conflict. War policies of the Serbian government including concentration camps, women rape and mass murders showed their intolerance towards Muslims. They wanted to cleanse all other ethnicities and exist solely. On the basis of psychological aspect, ethnic group share mutual fear, that their ethnic identity will be destroyed because of the ethnic cleansing by other group. Horowitz argued that psychological effects must be considered for understanding origins of ethnic conflict. He stated that ethnic conflict between groups was caused due to fear of extinction and they were motivated to use violence due to hostile feelings. Moreover, ethnic conflict in Bosnia was basically started due to feelings of prejudice. Psychological aspect is prominent in Serbian policies against the Muslims. Bosnia was a multi ethnic society that existed on the principles of tolerance and respect. When leaders started preaching hostility and prejudice it rapidly affected the followers. In every conflict emotions are a vital element, these are used by leaders to increase hostility and encourage violence (BAYRAKTAR).

International Factors

The Bosnian conflict was influenced by a large number of worldwide Christian and Muslim religious actors. By demonstrating their sympathies for fellow believers, Eastern Orthodox Churches significantly contributed to the fervent nationalism that sparked the Balkan War. For instance, the Greek Orthodox Church legitimized Athens' backing for the Orthodox Serb administrations in Pale and Belgrade and gave Serb war atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo cover. One such occurrence from the Bosnian Conflict was Radovan Karadzic was invited to Athens in the summer of 1993 to be honored and receive the Order of Saint Denys of Xante, one of their greatest accolades. Karadzic was charged with war atrocities by the "International Criminal Court" as the mastermind of the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 and finally imprisoned in July 2008. Additionally, the Catholic Church was also involved. Most crucially, after Croatia and Slovenia declared their freedom, the Vatican promptly accorded them diplomatic recognition (shortly after Germany and long before America did so). The Vatican's function evolved over time. Pope John Paul II made numerous calls for peace in Bosnia, including a dramatic visit in 1994 where he urged for "unity on the mountain of faith on which is planted the cross," but he had little direct control over the Croat clerics who lived there or the Croat militias who committed atrocities all throughout the war. Local demands overrode Vatican or American Catholic bishops' pressure on local Franciscan clerics who were being hunted down by Muslim troops and pushed to become more militant by Croat militias. Both good and bad Muslim actors from outside were equally involved in the Bosnian conflict. Throughout the battle, there were rumors that foreign Muslim soldiers, especially ex-combatants of the Afghan anti-Soviet war, were making their way to Bosnia to help their fellow Muslims fight Croats and Serbs. According to one Bosnian Muslim official the 'moral commitment of a Believer to help his brothers' was what these foreign soldiers came to fulfill (Burg & Shoup, 1999). There were several reports of conflict between the religious fanaticism of these foreigners and the Bosniak soldiers' rather moderate religious adherence. As gratitude for their support throughout the conflict, Bosnia offered citizenship to over 1,500 foreign Muslim combatants. The Yugoslav war crimes tribunal found Bosnian General Rasim Delic guilty of war atrocities in September 2008 for crimes against humanity committed while commanding such foreign combatants. The conflict's progress was also influenced by non-Orthodox Christian denominations. Some have harshly condemned Western Christians for their absence during the Bosnian conflict. A Catholic theologian named Reverend Adrian Hastings was one of the main opponents of the Christian reaction. He has called attention to the hypocrisy of a religious community

in Europe that mourns and denounces the Holocaust but turns a blind eye to the catastrophe developing in Bosnia. The World Council of Churches sent a delegation to evaluate assaults against women and other defenseless populations in the winter of 1992. The team's findings were documented in the report "Rape of the Women in War," which detailed mistreatment of women on all fronts of the conflict. Numerous religious organizations voiced a desire to assist in some form during the conflict but were unable to do so because of the circumstances. "United Methodist Committee for Relief" (UMCOR), Islamic Relief, Catholic Social Services, and Benevolencia are a few of the religiously motivated relief agencies that have operated in the area following the war (Burg & Shoup, 1999).

CONCLUSION

It was observed that even in ethnically diverse country like Bosnia-Herzegovina some regions are strongly held by a ethnic group, ethnic warfare start in these areas. In these areas a single ethnic group (or a coalition of groups) is demographically dominant and also has military dominance over its enemies. In Bosnia, some areas had significant Serb Population due to which these areas fell under Serb control soon after the conflict began. Yugoslav leader particularly the JNA strongly supported Serbs, due to which they were well organized, well armed and had back of strong military formation. These areas served as ground for outward offensive for cleansing and capturing adjoining territories. In Bosnia, military strength paired with ethnic ideology led to the crisis. When ethnic exclusionary thoughts were legitimized, it resulted in violent ethnic cleansing by militarily dominant side. Bosnian Serbs had unfilled territorial goals and they resorted to violent war tactics. They tried to merge regions dominated by ethnic diversity. For instance, Prijedor had Bosniak plurality, its surrounding municipalities had Serb majority. It was taken over by separatist Serb forces violently.

The root of the conflict was based upon historical, political and ideological problems. The Serbs were revengeful and considered Bosnian Muslims to be responsible of the actions of Ottoman Turkish Empire. Serbs considered Yugoslavia to be a Serb state, and Muslims as Ottoman occupier. There was clear prejudice for each other which resulted into attacks and ethnic conflicts. There was fight for political, bureaucratic and economic domination. After the fall of Yugoslavia in 1991, states started declaring independence one after the other. Due to the complex structure of the communities most painful and largest conflict occurred in Bosnia. The biggest factor was attempted to integrate three ethnic groups under one state. The structure of Bosnia was kind of the mosaic of Yugoslavia. This mosaic could not stay peacefully under a state. The Bosnian conflict was considered internal political dispute by the international world. In this situation, option of military intervention was not favored by many. It revealed the non significance of New World order and international security structures and assumptions that post Cold war era will be period of calmness proved to be wrong.

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